When one hears cautionary tales of lessons learned from Iran, minds race to 1979. “Remember the Revolution.” Remember the overthrow of the Pahlavi Dynasty, the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the Islamic Revolution that took the world by surprise.
Few, however, think about 1953 and the events that led to this transformative year in US-Iranian relations. On the heels of a century of Qajar Dynasty mismanagement and kleptocracy in Iran as well as decades of British exploitation of Iranian oil resources, a groundswell of nationalism captured the country with Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh – the “Patriot of Persia” – as the physical manifestation of this movement.
From the United Nations to college campuses, the world was a platform for Mossadegh, as he mesmerized listeners with David and Goliath tales of Iranians fighting back against British exploitation. Mossadegh stoked the Iranian nationalist flames with references to Persian greatness that reached back to days of Cyrus. His rhetoric was so widely heard that he was given Time Magazine’s Man of the Year award in 1951.
On May 1, 1951, Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company – later known as British Petroleum.
In response, Britain promised to pummel Iran into economic oblivion. Not a single drop of oil would leave that country. Oil tankards were locked in the ports, engineers were forbidden to enter Iran and restart the Abadan oil refinery in the absence of skilled British laborers, and the British threatened economic and political reprisals for any country willing to deal with the perpetrators of this brazen, Iranian act.
In the absence of oil exports, the Iranian economy would be crippled. Mossadegh persisted with his nationalization plans regardless. In a predominately Shia-Muslim nation, Mossadegh referenced Imam Husayn’s martyrdom in the 7th century CE in the name of a higher cause. So too would Iran in the 1950s suffer economic collapse in the name of nationalism and Iranian pride. For Iranians, for Shiites, and for Mossadegh, there was power in suffering and no amount of economic bullying on the part the British could deter Iranians from their goal.
In the years that followed, the CIA executed their first coup against a democratically elected regime, deposing Mossadegh in 1953, the country returned to two decades of authoritarian, pro-Western rule under the Shah and eventually in 1979 an Islamic Revolution transformed the nation.
There always was and will forever be strength in suffering. With this concept so deeply engrained in the culture, the people and the religion, suffering has become a form of political defiance and expression.
It is for these reasons that I find Eric Trager’s call for the United States to withhold its $4.8 billion loan to Egypt absolutely absurd. In his January 25, 2013 New Republic article “Back to Mubarak,” Trager calls for such a measure as a response to the Muslim Brotherhood’s anti-democratic actions.
Granted, the histories of the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran are radically different. One need only look at the Sunni-Shia rift to notice that there is not an even an overlapping consensus with regards to religious ideology.
Nevertheless, like the Iranian nationalists who suffered under centuries of exploitation and mistreatment, so too has the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a similarly difficult history since the formation of the Egyptian Republic in 1953.
It is only since the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that the Muslim Brotherhood has been permitted to exist formally as a political party. In the nearly six decades prior, the presidencies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak persecuted the Brotherhood, outlawing its political participation and arresting or executing its outspoken leaders.
With such a history, it is ridiculous to think that Mursi’s Muslim Brotherhood will bend in the face of economic threats. Rather, Trager’s suggestion runs the risk of radicalizing a country in such a critical time for the nation. The world has seen how Egypt has turned to religion in response to national hardships; an uptick of religiosity defined the years following defeat in the 1967 war.
Implementation of Trager’s proposed policy would not only fail to curb Mursi’s agenda, it would likely only strengthen the Brotherhood’s political support and further strain already tense US-Egyptian relations.
Policymakers in Washington must recognize that the Brotherhood cannot be economically bullied into compliance, for so too did Mossadegh accept financial collapse in the name of nationalism and a new Iran.