Jessica Chen Weiss is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Research Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies. Her research focuses on Chinese politics and international relations, nationalism, and social protest. She earned her Ph.D. in 2008 in political science from the University of California, San Diego and won the 2009 American Political Science Association Helen Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in international relations, law and politics. She teaches courses on Chinese foreign relations, state-society relations in post-Mao China, and anti-Americanism in world politics.
The Politic: Why do you think the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku [or Diaoyu] Islands has become so acrimonious on both sides? What stake does each country have in the islands?
Well, both sides claim sovereignty, and with the discovery of seabed resources—natural gas and oil deposits—these islands took on a salience that they hadn’t had beforehand. They were a subject of controversy even during the normalization of relations between China and Japan in the 1970s, but according to the Chinese side, both sides reached a tacit consensus to set aside the territorial dispute. But in more recent years, Japan, which controls the islands de facto, has denied that such an agreement was reached. That statement was made by a relatively nationalistic foreign minister who is no longer in that position, and then I think there’s a real concern on the Chinese side that the Japanese are taking actions unilaterally to assert sovereignty over the islands. So for both countries, it’s an issue that politicians find difficult to show moderate opinions on, because doing so invites other domestic voices to criticize them for being insufficiently patriotic and selling out the national interest. An important factor has been the activities of activists on both sides, with high-profile landings by Hong Kong activists, and then, in retaliation, activists from Japan as well, so both governments are effectively reacting to these provocations. But because the provocations are so high profile, it raises the stakes for both sides to communicate their resolve and take actions that seem to be defending their claims of sovereignty over the islands.
The Politic: The Chinese government has, for the most part, endorsed these anti-Japanese protests, but do you think it was taken aback by the intensity of the protests, and that it has underestimated the nationalism that it has instilled in its citizens? Or do you think it’s capitalizing on this surge of nationalism to further its agenda?
You know, I think that both elements are present. You’re right to point to the fact that the government seems to have tolerated the mobilization of these grassroots protests against Japan, but that it does not condone the violence and, in fact, has taken measures—maybe not sufficient measures—but measures, nonetheless, to protect Japanese diplomatic buildings and, to a lesser extent, stores. I think that each time nationalist protests break out in China, there are these acts of escalation where protestors become violent and often say things that the government doesn’t wish them to say, and every time, the commentators say that the government “misjudged.” But because this has happened so many times, it’s hard to imagine that it wasn’t at least partially anticipated. Nonetheless, the scale of it does seem to be somewhat larger than in the past.
Also, what I think has been interesting is the degree to which public opinion generally has turned against the protests and seen them as illegitimate, particularly because of the violence although the government has encouraged, through the official media and editorials, [criticism] condemning the violence and irrational behavior of these protestors. So, in short, I think that the appearance that public opinion is slightly out of control is something that does benefit the Chinese government as it tries to communicate to Japan and the United States that China really would be willing to escalate over these islands and that it’s not willing to give up its claims, even though it has this appearance of being a little less in control than it might like to be. But in recent days, [the government] has been able to put a stop to the protests, and we’ll see whether this signals a new realization on the part of the government that this is an unwise tactic—that it is more counterproductive than productive. I don’t know, we’ll see.
The Politic: Now I want to talk a little bit about China’s upcoming leadership transition. Xi Jinping [who is slated to succeed Hu Jintao as China’s paramount leader in 2013] recently disappeared from the public for two weeks with no official explanation. Do you think his disappearance reflects intraparty struggles and foreshadows a difficult transition of power?
Unfortunately, I think that we really have no solid ground on which to draw any firm conclusions. It’s good for China that he reappeared and seems to be in as good health as he does—I think that the speculation was potentially damaging to the appearance of a stable and successful transition, but it has all since more or less died down, although we’re still awaiting the announcement of when the National Party Congress will take place [which the government finally announced, after much speculation, will begin on November 8]. But at least there don’t seem to be any lingering repercussions of his disappearance. Perhaps the excuse that he had a swimming-pool injury, or whatnot, is plausible enough that it doesn’t portend anything more serious.
The Politic: There’s a lot of hope that the new Chinese government under Xi Jinping will enact some much-needed political and economic reforms, especially since the government seems to be reaching a critical point as the economy slows down and more people demand changes in the political system. Do you share this hope, or do you think it’s too idealistic?
I think that we all hope [for] — but we don’t expect — political reform. I think that the Chinese government has a lot of challenges, and it’s very difficult for leaders to embark on what may be very risky ventures. There are many, many pressures for change, but it is far from clear how the government can get from where it is today, in terms of the political institutions, to one in which you have greater accountability and rule of law, etc., without potentially setting in motion what [the government] fears would be chain of events that would destabilize the country. I think there is a really strong status quo bias. I don’t want to say that there is no hope, because if there were no hope China would be in a much more depressing situation, but I don’t expect to see bold measures for change.
The Politic: But at the same time, if the government does nothing, will things boil over?
I think that the government has thus far been quite flexible in responding to pressures from below and accommodating, or at least nipping in the bud, grievances as they bubble up. [It is] addressing problems, trying to ensure that they don’t reoccur, but I agree with you that absent more systematic channels for people to express their grievances, there will remain this perception that the government is fragile and even unable to truly respond to demands for greater accountability in a more long-lasting way.
The Politic: China is still dealing with the fallout from the Bo Xilai scandal [in which Bo Xilai, a rising politician, was ousted from the Communist Party due to his alleged connection to a murder plot]. How much do you the scandal is affecting China’s leadership transition?
Again, I think that it has certainly introduced a much greater degree of uncertainty about whether or not the leadership will be able to transition in a smooth fashion. What exactly his fall means for the content of the next ten years of China’s political and economic development is much less clear. With these strong personalities—and maybe this is wishful thinking—there is a desire to see in people hints of a policy direction. But his ouster could be attributed to many things, not least of which are the crimes that have been attributed, at least officially, to his family members. So what exactly this all means is pretty unclear.
Cindy Hwang is a sophomore in Berkeley College.