Last Wednesday, I awoke—quite literally—to one of the most significant developments in U.S.-Cuba relations since the countries halted contact in 1961. At noon, stumbling out of my bedroom in a daze, I ordered my suitemates to turn on C-Span, CNN—any station where I could watch President Obama announce the restoration of full diplomatic ties with Cuba.
Obama’s speech introduced a new era of relations between Washington and Havana, which began with the release of Alan Gross, a USAID worker imprisoned in Cuba since 2009 under charges of subversion. There was also a spy exchange that returned to Cuba the last three spies of the “Cuban Five” spy network, arrested and convicted in Miami of conspiracy against the U.S. in the late 1990s.
Going forward, the U.S. will soon establish a full-scale embassy in Havana, replacing the current, limited U.S. Interests Section (part of the Swiss Embassy in Cuba). Obama’s new stance will further liberalize travel and expand exceptions to the economic embargo, allowing U.S. telecommunications firms to conduct business on the island, for instance. In the future, travelers to Cuba will be able to use credit and debit cards through branches of U.S. financial institutions there.
The thorough review of U.S. policy toward Cuba that occurred after Obama’s reelection seemed to concern itself with answering the question, ‘Does the United States continue the embargo and diplomatically isolating Cuba? Or do we try something new?’ Proponents of the first option commonly contend that because the Castro regime has not ceased its abuse of the Cuban people, continuing its denial of their most basic political and economic rights, the U.S. should, in turn, continue to deny the Cuban government the economic respite that would come with renewed U.S. engagement.
It is undeniably true that the Cuban people are still oppressed by an authoritarian regime responsible for persistent, severe human rights abuses. Yet to continue the 53-year old U.S. cold-shoulder toward Cuba would be to ignore the reality of its ineffectiveness in bringing down the Castro regime. Indeed, Fidel Castro held onto power even after Cuba lost its primary benefactor, the Soviet Union, in 1991 and faced a harsher embargo, codified into law by the Helms-Burton act in 1996.
The trade embargo and diplomatic estrangement, forged in the throes of the Cold War, was given a deserved and wholehearted try. But after decades of fruitless efforts—and no reason to believe that it will work any time soon—a new tactic was certainly in order. Obama’s departure from the strategy of his predecessors thus presents the exciting prospect that the U.S. could press for human rights in Cuba through a fresh approach.
Once home in Miami, I quickly remembered my vague presentiment that Obama’s move would not exactly please many Cuban-Americans. Long the haven for the Cuban exile community, Miami has been the headquarters for anti-Castro activities since 1959. It was not surprising, then, that I heard arguments against the détente ranging from accusations that a Communist-leaning Obama is in league with the Castro regime to more level-headed skepticism of the Cuban government’s willingness to relinquish its authoritarian hold on power.
First among the most salient criticisms of the White House’s decision is the contention that the United States has conceded far too much in restoring relations. Often, opponents claim there was no fairness in exchanging three Cuban spies, tried and convicted in a justice system that works, for non-spy Alan Gross.
To clarify, Alan Gross was not involved in the release of the three Cuban spies. Rather, the Castro regime handed over a highly valuable Cuban national spying for the U.S. in exchange for the remaining “Cuban Five” members. Indeed, the U.S. spy was responsible for relaying the Cuban government’s encryption codes to Washington, thereby enabling U.S. intelligence to uncover the Cuban Five’s plot. It was a spy-for-spy exchange that had a great deal of historic precedent and value to the U.S.
More importantly, the United States has actually conceded quite little. The U.S. Interest Section in Havana already holds more diplomats than the embassy of any other country in Cuba’s capital. Moreover, calling the move from hostility to negotiation a concession is unproductive and would impede conflict resolution in any situation.
Secondly, there is concern that Cuba will sabotage future negotiations, just as it did during similar engagements with the Carter and Clinton administrations: a defiant Castro will once again humiliate the United States.
Although possible, it is far less likely that Havana would obstruct reengagement now than in the past. Cuban President Raúl Castro seems more pragmatic and levelheaded than his older brother. Raúl’s reforms since assuming power in 2006, which have allowed private Cuban entrepreneurs to become responsible for a fifth of Cuban economic activity, indicate that he is open to change. Furthermore, his independent decision to release 53 political prisoners last Wednesday hints that he is well aware of U.S. concern for human rights in Cuba. While not entirely certain, Cuban cooperation seems probable.
Third and most challenging is the argument that a large number of nations already send tourists to and engage in trade with Cuba—yet the economic and political lot of the Cuban people has not improved. It is widely held that by extending an economic lifeline to Cuba, the U.S. will enable the sustained oppression of the Cuban people. This criticism correctly addresses the whole point: pressuring the Cuban government to grant Cubans the universal political and economic rights they have been denied since 1959.
While Obama’s new policies liberalize travel and trade, they seem designed to avoid strengthening the Communist Party’s grip. Travel remains restricted to twelve government-approved categories that could support civil society, such as humanitarian workers, journalists, and businesspeople. Under the newest travel policy, U.S. citizens in those categories will no longer have to seek government approval to travel. In short, tourism for tourism’s sake is still prohibited.
The newly sanctioned trade likewise seems to focus on the goal of political change on the island. New telecommunications infrastructure will connect Cubans to one another and to the outside world, which could greatly empower civil society. A fraction of U.S. investment in Cuban entrepreneurial ventures may end up in state coffers, but enabling the private sector in Cuba would nevertheless be worthwhile.
These criticisms rightly question the future effectiveness of new U.S. policy. Yet already, Obama has won foreign policy successes in the Western Hemisphere. Leaders throughout Latin America have publicly applauded Obama’s shift, indicating that Obama’s move has removed an old thorn in the side of U.S.-Latin American relations. With newfound regional popularity and respect, Obama could gather southern allies to engage Cuba and pressure it to correct its dismal human rights record. A unified American front campaigning for human rights in Cuba would certainly be far more effective than the disjointed and conspiratorial efforts thus far.
Undoubtedly, working out the details of full relations with Cuba will be very difficult. On both sides of the Florida Straits, there are groups committed to upholding a status quo that has proved to be detrimental to the Cuban people and U.S. interests. Obama’s new path presents an opportunity for the U.S. to depart from a failed strategy, thereby gaining respect from regional neighbors and the international community. Most importantly, the policy shift indicates that the U.S. is willing to do what it takes to hasten the day that political and economic liberty will be restored to the Cuban people.