The State of Affairs in the South China Sea
One hundred miles from the Chinese mainland, separated by a narrow strait, lies the island of Taiwan. Amidst a host of conflicts striking various regions of the globe, its relationship with China has reached its worst point in 40 years. As one of Taiwan’s closest allies, the United States is vigilantly monitoring the escalating hostility. However, the two nations are approximately 6,700 miles apart—an incredible distance even in this age of globalization. China’s close proximity to Taiwan prevents the U.S. from furtively maintaining a significant military presence or developing channels of communication with its ally. Statements made by Chinese leaders over the past few decades propounding the necessity and inevitability of reunification have kept Washington on high alert. Recent contretemps suggest that the situation is only escalating, and some American admirals worry that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a troubling sign of the harm that authoritarian powers are capable of inflicting.
This newfound intensification is rooted in a mix of diplomatic designations, perceived territorial threats, and ideological disagreements. Prevailing in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Japan took control of the Taiwanese territory, which had frequently been a refuge for Chinese migrants. After Japan’s surrender during WWII, it returned the land to China, then governed by the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek as the Republic of China. When Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces seized the mainland and established the separate People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the 1949 Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek and his troops retreated to Taiwan. The island became the sole territory under the Republic of China’s governance, though its leaders continued to lay claim to the mainland. The CCP simultaneously claimed that it controlled Taiwan. The following year, while defending South Korea against its belligerent northern neighbor, the United States positioned a fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent the CCP from executing an invasion. The strategy succeeded, keeping both sides separate but constantly asserting their ownership of the other state’s territory. Each side claimed to be the sole legitimate China. Severe hostilities, including the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises, persisted until the 1980s.
Diplomatic labels did little to mitigate the disputes. The United Nations recognized the PRC as the sole representative of China in 1971 and Washington followed suit in 1979, terminating official relations with Taiwan. The conflict for global recognition further complicated the relationship between both countries and the international stage. The 1980s saw relations thaw, coinciding with Taiwan’s gradual process of democratization. In 1993, China and Taiwan agreed to establish regular contact, and Beijing declined to acknowledge any change in their relationship three years later when Taiwan oversaw its first fully democratic presidential election. However, leading up to the vote, China conducted systematic wargames, perhaps feeling threatened by this break from authoritarianism. The third Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 destroyed the burgeoning relationship that the two countries had previously enjoyed.
Beijing has never treated the two countries as separate territories, so it harbors enmity toward international institutions and foreign states that distinguish them nonetheless. China espouses the “constitutive theory” of international relations, which legitimates the existence of a state only if other states recognize it. This is opposed to the “declarative theory,” by which a state exists only if it satisfies certain qualifications, including well-defined boundaries, an identifiable and stable population, a lasting government, and diplomatic outlets. This distinction has historically led China to deal with Taiwan as if they formed the same state, with no regard for delineated borders. For instance, in 2008, Taiwan accused China of aiming approximately 1,000 missiles in its direction, a threat to its territorial integrity. Diplomatic disaccord, resistance toward territorial unification, and a progressive ideological split form the backdrop of the present tension.
Taiwan has long considered itself to be an independent, sovereign state. Its government functions without input from Beijing, but its diplomatic status remains contentious because China refuses to recognize it as a separate country. Indeed, China consistently depicts Taiwan as a self-evident issue. A few weeks ago, Qin Gang, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, published an opinion piece in the Washington Post responding to parallels between the Russian invasion of Ukraine and an impending takeover of Taiwan. He wrote that this comparison is “a mistake. These are totally different things. Ukraine is a sovereign state, while Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory. The Taiwan question is a Chinese internal affair.” By depicting its relationship with Taiwan as a domestic issue, China leaves the door open for an invasion at any moment.
Polls from 2020 conclude that 75% of Taiwanese citizens already consider themselves independent from the mainland even if formal independence has not been declared. In this sense, the general population seems content with the status quo and has not yet begun discussing de jure independence. However, societal detachment from China is increasingly becoming the norm. For instance, a candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party triumphed in the 2020 presidential election—winning 57% of the popular vote—after running a campaign emphasizing the need for Taiwan to resist China’s authoritarian pressure (though not calling for formal independence by any means). Regardless of Taiwanese public opinion, China continues to encroach on the island, which puts the U.S. in an uncomfortable position. In recent summits, Chinese president Xi Jinping has been clear about his support for the One China principle—the idea that China and Taiwan form one sovereign state—by using various methods to convey his expectations to the U.S.
A Look Back at Crucial November Statements
When U.S. President Joe Biden met with Xi virtually on November 16, 2021, Xi made use of “both deterrence and reassurance” during his discourse, according to Bonnie Glaser, the director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Glaser pointed to two phrases used by Xi during the meeting, one emphasizing that the U.S. is “playing with fire” by meddling in Chinese affairs but that China is “patient” and “willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity.” Glaser believes that Xi’s reassurances signal that reunification is not an urgent priority for Beijing and that he has not decided to use force against Taiwan.
Several experts concurred with Glaser, arguing that the media has misrepresented the violence that China is willing to use to take over Taiwan. This is not to say that China has not overseen concerning military developments. In fact, the country is pushing the boundaries of what is militarily possible by launching technologically astounding hypersonic missiles. It also hopes to dramatically expand its nuclear arsenal. America is right to be wary, but such advancements do not necessarily signal an imminent takeover.
“To take an island that size with that many defenders, even if everything works in your favor, takes a long time,” Eric Heginbotham, a specialist in Asian security issues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told The Politic. “It takes weeks, perhaps months.” As a result, if China attempts an invasion today, it would attract an enormous amount of unfavorable international attention and the U.S. would have enough time to react and launch a counterattack. Since any invasion operation would be at least partly amphibious, landing ships and their escorts would have to anchor offshore, which would enable U.S. aerial forces to locate offensive Chinese troops before striking back. This solves the American Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) problem, according to Heginbotham.
How Other Countries Play a Critical Role
A forced reunification would also sound the alarm for Taiwanese allies who would perceive such an invasion as a threat to their own interests. “Japan and Australia have already pledged help. Chinese moves in the South Pacific and East China Sea have worried Germany, the U.K., and especially France, due to its South Pacific possessions,” said Professor Jane Teufel Dreyer of the University of Miami. “France also has the largest navy, including the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle with a larger, follow-on boat to eventually replace it.” In essence, the United States would not be on its own if it were required to stand up to Chinese aggression.
Other Asian countries that side with Taiwan have also expressed their support for the region because they recognize that a military spillover could cause conflict in areas beyond the Taiwan Strait. “U.S. allies and partners in the region contribute to balancing China’s activities through diplomatic and economic channels, as well as by upholding and reinforcing liberal international norms,” Pamela Kennedy, a Research Analyst with the East Asia program at the Stimson Center, explained to The Politic. “I think this is a major factor in Japan’s recent vocal support of Taiwan’s security, because there is a growing awareness of the proximity of Taiwan and Japan’s southwest islands,” she added.
As the past year has shown, however, China is taking its time with calculated escalation, suggesting that an attack on Taiwan may not simply be a blatant demonstration of force. In March 2019, China rewrote history by absolving itself of any criticism after two jet fighters crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which has always been mutually respected by the two states. “The PRC [People’s Republic of China] said that the median line has never existed,” said David Sacks, a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “There should be a cost to unilaterally altering the status quo,” he argues. This violation set the precedent for additional incursions, one of which took place in May 2021 when China flew two fighter-bombers ovr the established line.
Such a move is characteristic of China’s strategy: making advances that are small enough not to provoke a counterattack but significant enough to attract international attention. This tends to place Taiwan’s allies in awkward positions since it would be inappropriate to react to China’s provocations with violence, but ignoring the act is negligent. This is why the U.S. has constantly had to manipulate the way it verbally treats Taiwan. George W. Bush, for instance, was forced to modify his convictions after entering the White House. “When he came in, he leaned pretty far towards Taiwan,” said Heginbotham. “The Chinese reacted very negatively. Bush ended up rebalancing.” In 2003, he declared, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo,” a stance that China praised.
Washington’s Posture
The term “strategic ambiguity” captures how the U.S. has historically dealt with Taiwan’s tense relations with the mainland. American officials and policy makers have traditionally supported a conditional response to secure U.S. interests in the region without instigating conflict with the Chinese. If the U.S. takes any clear position, it will agitate China and therefore force Asian allies to prepare for the possibility of a Chinese military advance. Allies may not necessarily want to be dragged into a conflict as a consequence of the United States’ position and may prefer to get involved only once China violates certain unacceptable conditions.
In a 2020 Foreign Affairs article, Glaser argued why strategic ambiguity is the best long-term approach for the U.S: “A clear statement of U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan regardless of the circumstances could embolden pro-independence constituencies in Taiwan to promote their cause.” Since China already assumes that the U.S. will intervene in the event of a takeover, proponents of strategic ambiguity believe that adopting a unilateral commitment to defend Taiwan could provoke an attack. The U.S. should defend a peaceful status quo by being prepared to defend Taiwan if Beijing were to attack, but, according to experts like Glaser and Kennedy, it would not be prudent to provide an ironclad pledge prior to the outbreak of conflict.
Others disagree. Sacks believes that “strategic clarity” may be more beneficial in response to China’s implacable development. “After 40 years of strategic ambiguity, the benefits are fading because there are no indications that Taiwan is going to go towards independence,” Sacks believes. “My primary concern is that in the coming years the Chinese will calculate that the U.S. will not come to Taiwan’s aid.” Following this logic, Sacks argues that deterrence has lost its value and that the U.S. must take a position that unequivocally supports peace in the South China Sea. Explicitly backing up Taiwan might discourage conflict in the region.
Sacks responded to proponents of strategic ambiguity in a Foreign Affairs piece co-authored with Richard Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The duo also clarified certain misconceptions about their perspective. Strategic clarity can coexist with “a refusal to establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan,” they wrote. The United States does not have to unequivocally support Taiwanese independence or provoke conflict when it transitions to a more unambiguous policy, according to Haass and Sacks. Instead, “strategic clarity only adds weight to the long-standing U.S. position that any resolution of cross-strait differences must occur peacefully and with the consent of the people involved,” they added. The U.S. will not tolerate if China moves violently and eschews the democratic process.
Both sides have their merits. Ambiguity allows the U.S. to pivot with dexterity while clarity eliminates any doubt that the U.S. will condone conflict in the region. They are each concerned with preserving peace and simply champion different methods to achieve this goal.
Another compatible way to analyze the ongoing situation is through the often overlooked lens of cooperation and international ties. The nature of the Asian system of alliances is peculiar compared to Europe. For NATO, a collective security alliance binds all participating countries together. As Jakub Grygiel, a professor of politics at the Catholic University of America, puts it, “an attack against one is an attack against all.” NATO’s overarching multilateral alliance system contrasts with Asia, where bilateral deals tie states together. For example, Japan and Vietnam would independently condemn a Chinese invasion of Taiwan but may not be able to execute a coordinated response against aggression. “This creates some flexibility but also a level of doubt about whether these powers will come to the aid of Taiwan,” Grygiel added.
Next Steps for the United States
In order to eliminate any doubt, the United States must actively lead the way in productive dialogue that reduces differences in information between countries. In doing so, it must be careful to address the right countries at the right time while balancing open- and closed-door cooperation. “If public announcements could cause Taiwan more harm than good due to Beijing’s reaction, the cooperation could be conducted quietly,” said Kennedy. However, to ensure that China does not feel excluded from diplomatic relations, the U.S. should also engage in public talks with them. This may include strategic messaging or deterrence, according to Kennedy. As for other crucial allies in the region such as Japan, the U.S. can raise awareness as to why Taiwan’s security matters so that the Japanese population feels more invested in the issue.
Biden and Xi’s November 16th meeting was a modest step in the right direction. While neither country adapted its stance and Xi moved back and forth from reassurances and deterrences, the discussion set an excellent example for lower officials in both countries. Since all Chinese executive power is now concentrated in Xi’s hands, communication between global leaders about Taiwan can motivate officials to engage in their own meaningful dialogue, according to Sacks. “My view is that the purpose of those talks…was to set a framework to have officials underneath them have these types of conversations,” Sacks explained. Spectators may initially be frustrated by the lack of specificity in these types of exchanges, but Sacks emphasized that this is not their intention. “It is not appropriate for leaders to get into the nitty-gritty,” said Sacks. Lower officials in both countries are responsible for laying out specific guidelines, but the top executive must speak in broad terms so that the meeting can focus on bilateral relations generally. Sacks also noted that the militaries of both countries should increase their communication, especially if the U.S. intends to lead military exercises in Taiwan or sell them more weapons.
In addition to promoting peaceful dialogue with Xi Jinping, the U.S. should also consider China’s domestic motivations. Since Xi aims to present himself as China’s unfaltering leader, a takeover might be unlikely because the costs of a defeat would be unimaginable. Experts also don’t believe that China has garnered the military might to invade Taiwan in less time than it would take for allies to come to its defense. “If your fleet is a smoking ruin and Taiwan has rounded up large numbers of Chinese prisoners on Taiwan, there’s no way to spin that as a victory,” said Heginbotham.
On top of a military catastrophe, Xi would face severe political repercussions in Beijing. His party would be undermined, his control over China’s international image would weaken, and his goal of national rejuvenation would suffer, according to Glaser. Entering a war with the U.S. would turn many potential allies against China and impede the country’s economic projects, including the Belt and Road Initiative. “There is sustained participation from key treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, which host U.S. forces or bases that are essential for maintaining a U.S. presence in the region,” said Kennedy. These bases would hinder China from securing an easy victory, and as soon as the conflict is prolonged, the U.S. stands a better chance at successfully defending Taiwan—a war Americans certainly never hope to see.
This is why the U.S. must also anticipate a more gradual, non-military takeover of Taiwan. China presumably understands that Washington would intervene if it launched a violent invasion, especially after the crisis in Ukraine. Weaponizing state media, relying on cyberattacks, and slowly influencing Taiwanese governmental institutions could pave the way for a drawn-out reunification that ultimately complicates American intervention. If the U.S. sent its military to the South China Sea without Beijing explicitly declaring an attack, China would be able to point to American forces as the instigators of conflict. This is why communication with Taiwan about subversive Chinese pressure will be absolutely key in the years to come.
No matter what happens, Taiwan, the U.S., Japan, and other allies must be prepared for the worst-case scenario. Fortunately, Taiwan has taken a number of impressive steps in the right direction. In 2017, Taiwan’s Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-ming developed the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which proposes a rigorous system of defense focused on Taiwan’s littoral zone—the waters that extend one hundred kilometers around Taiwan’s shores. Drew Thompson, a former U.S. Defense Department official specialized in bilateral relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, outlined the three phases of the ODC in a paper for the Institute for National Strategic Studies: “force preservation, decisive battle in the littoral zone, and destruction of the enemy at the landing beach.”
To aid Taiwan, the U.S. boosted Taiwan’s defense capabilities by selling $750 million worth of weapons in August 2021 and funneling support to Japan. Taiwan’s spending budget has also gradually been increasing, according to Glaser, who stressed the importance of investing in the right equipment. The U.S. doesn’t always “make weapons that Taiwan needs…we have to start talking about co-production,” Glaser said. Historically, Taiwan has been attracted by the latest cutting-edge equipment, such as advanced fighters. These are “very expensive and simply not survivable in a war against China,” according to Heginbotham. “Those systems soak up a lot of their budget [that] Taiwan could put into other things that are vastly more resilient and survivable [like] anti-aircraft missiles.”
While Taiwan’s ODC is missing details about personnel and logistics, according to Thompson, U.S. officials have still vociferously advocated for the plan because it represents a robust, multi-step, defensive Taiwanese solution. The U.S. has also continued to sell missiles and launchers to Taiwan in past years. Admiral Lee has emphasized that the U.S. and Taiwan can work together to exchange expertise and diverse capabilities through the ODC to provide Taiwan with the best defense in case of a Chinese invasion.
As of right now, Taiwan’s capability to defend China militarily and the aid that its allies will provide remain open questions. What is certain is that the China-Taiwan divide is fragile, with new disputes, resolutions, and accords happening daily in response to the most subtle diplomatic decisions. For example, China recently castigated the U.S. for violating the One China principle by leaving the PRC out of a democracy summit while inviting Taiwan.
Perhaps the best way to understand the current situation is to analyze the measures that the U.S. should take before and during a conflict. Cooperation and exchange of information with Asian allies and China are crucial to ensure that every actor is on the same page. Some diplomacy may need to be conducted privately to avoid provocation while some can be public so that China does not feel excluded from ongoing conversations.
Why Taiwan Matters
Defending Taiwan is absolutely crucial in an era of economic volatility, great power competition, and human rights violations. If China is able to successfully invade Taiwan, this would mark the start of what Elbridge Colby, the chief architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, calls a “focused and sequential strategy.” China could start looking to control its neighbors one-by-one in the Asian hemisphere with its newfound economic power. Indeed, bringing Taiwan under its grasp would enable China to have uncontested dominion over the transactions and trade constantly taking place in the South China Sea. One third of all global shipping passes through this body of water, amounting to an astounding $5.3 trillion per year. Moreover, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that there is between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas to be unearthed in the region.
Incorporating Taiwan into its territory would enable China to swell economically, and consequently, dedicate even more resources toward its military might. Of course, this newfound access to resources and trade routes would have little utility since China would most likely be condemned and isolated on the international stage before being hit by sanctions like those that have devastated the Russian economy. However, the South China Sea would not lose its economic importance. Countries opposed to the invasion would eventually be forced to return to trade with China, the gatekeeper of Asia’s crucial markets.
If China manages to establish hegemony over Asia, forcing European countries to accept Chinese economic pressure, the United States could be barred from crucial international transactions. Free markets would be undermined as the U.S. suffers an irrecoverable blow to its credibility. Asian democracies would turn their back on Washington due to its inability to protect their interests, leading to the destabilization of the alliance system that the U.S. has constructed since its inception.
This Chinese influence would be paired with a variety of human rights violations such as those that the Uyghurs have already tragically experienced. Undeterred by ethnic and cultural cleansing, the Chinese would certainly not shy away from these measures as they expand to other countries, starting with Taiwan. Thus, the United States must work closely with its allies, notably Japan, India, and Australia, to prevent any part of this domino effect from taking place.
Regardless of whether ambiguity or clarity is favored, the U.S. should be prepared for a war, even though this is an undesirable outcome. In any given international conflict, participants must recognize the worst-case scenario, attempt to avoid it, but have an adequate response if all else fails. The U.S. must continue working closely with Taiwan by selling adequate defense weapons, working with Taiwan’s new military plans (like the ODC), and laying out concrete measures if China continues to ramp up tensions. This compartmentalization will maximize the chance to avoid disputes while also preparing the U.S. for war if a peaceful solution does not arise. The debate over Taiwan has the U.S. walking on eggs, and it will only succeed at achieving peace if it moves cautiously and strategically.