Sergiy Kyslytsya is the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations and Ukraine’s Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. Before arriving at the UN, he served as Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2014, during Russia’s annexation of Crimea, until 2019. He was awarded the Order of Merit of the III degree, which is given to individuals of outstanding achievement in Ukraine, for his many years of diplomatic service and role in international cooperation. Kyslytsya agreed to be interviewed by The Politic after attending a talk hosted by Lester Crown Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld at the Yale School of Management.
I wanted to start off with a broad question about the war in Ukraine, since we are on the eve of its 1-year anniversary. Could you give our readers your assessment of how things have changed since Russian troops arrived and where things may be going?
First of all, we should recall that while it is the first anniversary of the full–scale invasion, it has really been more than eight years since the war started. The war basically began in 2014, when the Russians moved into Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine, in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. Recently, at least two decisions by two major international courts established that there has been a Russian war effort [since 2014]. These decisions established that the so-called “separatists” [pro-Russian paramilitary groups operating in Ukraine] were controlled by the Russians, who supplied them with weapons and money. Effectively, the court in Amsterdam established that there already was a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. A decision by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg similarly concluded that Russia invaded the eastern part of Ukraine, long before the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Within the scope of my responsibility, I can assert that the reaction of the international community has been very solid. It is apparent that before the invasion [Putin] believed the democratic community might have reacted negatively. But if the invasion was successful, he thought the world community would swallow the war. He miscalculated. We have achieved a strong sense of unity, not only among our trans–Atlantic allies, but also in the General Assembly Hall [of the United Nations], where that support has been clear on several occasions, including in March and October of 2022. I think [the war] may become a decisive point in the history of the United Nations and in how [people] see 21st-century global security architecture. When it comes to the United Nations, the war has proven that it doesn’t work because it was not able to prevent one country from launching a full–scale invasion against a neighboring country.
The war has proven that the [United Nations] doesn’t work because it was not able to prevent one country from launching a full-scale invasion against a neighboring country.
What are the biggest flaws of international organizations like the United Nations and the International Criminal Court that preclude them from accomplishing these goals?
I think it is kind of an overstatement to suggest that international law and the United Nations cannot prevent [conflict]. They can. But there are specific cases where the design of the United Nations or the role of international law cannot stop regimes, like the one that exists today in Moscow. The thing is, no matter how wonderful and great and well–worded international rules and conventions are, they still rely on the readiness and willingness of international actors to comply with the obligations that those actors themselves, endorsed, signed, or approved. And, on the other side, [these conventions] rely on the readiness of the international community to enforce its laws and to punish the violators.
That’s exactly what I said in the last Security Council meeting, when I referred to the guru of nonviolence, Mahatma Gandhi, who said that abstinence from violence makes sense only if there is the power to punish the violators… I don’t believe that we will ever, in the real world, reach the point of full compliance with international law. However, I hope we will draw lessons from what happened in the last twenty-five years, when we –– I mean all of us, Ukraine, Europe, North America, the global community –– allowed Putin to build a dictatorship that is totally beyond the control of whatever international norms we have.
How could the United Nations be improved to a point where, if a resolution was passed, it would be followed by someone like Putin?
I don’t want to offend anyone in the United Nations, but I think we grew accustomed to a very significant degree of hypocrisy in international relations and, in particular, multilateral organizations where we hide behind our common desire to make unanimous decisions. The benefit of making decisions by consensus is that, if it is truly a decision of consensus, then everyone is behind it. This is absolutely not true, in my opinion, because consensus is not [unanimity], but rather the lowest common denominator that allows for a decision to be approved. A significant percentage of the decisions we make in the United Nations are so low in terms of their denominator that they hardly serve any purpose.
When it comes to conflict, the United Nations is not ready [to achieve consensus], because there are a small number of countries, like Russia, Syria, and North Korea, that would never agree to make decisions that are in full accordance with the UN Charter. So, really, we need to abandon consensus — the starting point is to start being hypercritical and have the guts to call a spade a spade.
We will have a Summit for the Future –– an exceptionally ambitious name for a summit in 2024 –– and, from what I know, the Secretary General himself may present a new concept of international security. I’m looking forward to that summit, and to seeing if the UN Secretariat leadership will be courageous enough to factor in the events of the last year in their concept paper on international security.
Countries like China and India have condemned the war on paper, yet have failed to support Ukraine directly or even to comply with Western sanctions. Can you discuss Ukraine’s relationship with these two powers, and what you think of other nations that merely pay lip service to Ukraine?
We should not simplify the positions of these two countries, nor those of other countries. China is a fully–fledged, legitimate, and, like Russia, permanent member of the Security Council. China is a global player. Although I’ve heard Chinese officials saying ‘oh, don’t overplay our global role, we just want to develop economically,’ they are a global power, given their economic and financial role and their impact on global affairs. They are, after all, a fully–fledged, permanent member [of the Security Council] with a particular responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In fact, if one reads carefully, the UN Charter is a kind of deal between the permanent members and the rest of the community, who trust the permanent members with special rights in exchange for their special role in the maintenance of international peace and security. You don’t ask Germany or Italy, who are not permanent members, why the hell they’re not that active, because it is up to the permanent members to act.
India is not a permanent member, but India is one of the largest economies not only in the region, but globally. India is a rapidly developing economic power that concluded its membership on the Security Council on December 31st, 2022. [India was on the Security Council] for the last two years –– for the entire year of the Russian full–scale invasion of Ukraine. Yes, they did not always vote with [Western powers], and especially the General Assembly on some occasions, but they never supported the Russian Federation.
We have to make this distinction clear. The fact that [India] did not support some of the decisions [by Ukraine’s Western allies] does not put them on Russia’s side.
I decisively and categorically reject statements that ask, ‘why the hell did China vote the Russian way?’ China does not vote the Russian way. China has a clear set of national interests, and the fact that Chinese national interests may not coincide with American interests or with European interests does not make China a pro–Russian country. China has its own grievances when it comes to the Western world and its politics and actions towards China. In this conversation, we are not going to explore who is right and who is wrong. When it comes to foreign policy and other issues, [NATO] and China are on different pages, which does not make China pro-Russia, per se.
Let’s circle back to something you just mentioned, when you called China a legitimate member of the Security Council, in contrast with Russia. I think that a lot of people don’t understand that distinction. Russia took the Soviet Union’s permanent seat on the Security Council after its dissolution. Could you walk us through how that happened, and tell us whether steps are being taken to address Russia’s seizure of a seat that, in theory, was designed to represent all of the former members of the USSR?
It’s very difficult to cover this in a couple of minutes. Even if we put aside the issue of how the Russian Federation landed in the Security Council in 1991, we must answer the question: are Russian actions, in particular from the 24th of February onwards, compatible with the criteria set forth in the UN Charter for its permanent membership? The answer is clear: Russian actions are not compatible with the criteria for membership. Practically every other country would be suspended from the United Nations if they launched an aggression of [Russia’s] scale, with such an enormous number of people killed, wounded, and displaced.
Russia exploits the right of permanent membership, and, since Russia is quote-unquote “protected” by its nuclear status, actions to expel Russia or strip it of its rights are immobilized by the Russian veto. So there is not only the issue of how Russia landed in the Security Council, but there’s also the fact that the General Assembly and the Security Council are absolutely emancipated –– emancipated! –– from their power to address the issue of Russian actions.
What happened [when the Russian Federation acquired its seat on the Security Council] was very unfortunate. The West was not ready to deal with the speed of the disintegration of the Soviet Union; there were no contingency plans. And practically every nation’s government –– be it Washington, London, Berlin, Paris, or Beijing –– was worried about what would happen with this huge territory: the largest country on the planet, with the largest nuclear arsenal, and with huge debt to international lenders. I think that they were happy to reach this arrangement, which allowed Moscow to be the continuation of the Soviet Union, both in terms of nuclear arsenals, Soviet debt, and the Soviet seat in the Security Council. They acted in what they probably believed were the interests of the entire global community. This does not change the legal position of my government [on the Russian Federation’s inheriting of the USSR’s seat on the Security Council]. We believe that the way Russia was allowed to take the seat was legally incorrect.
In what ways has Russia’s possession of the USSR’s seat on the Security Council impeded Ukraine’s efforts to wage war, to make peace, and to protect its citizens?
Well, Russia vetoed the decisions that we put forth at the beginning of the war in 2014. Russia vetoed the draft that we sponsored with our partners right after the full–scale invasion in 2022. But it has also impacted us beyond that. Look, for example, at the situation with the Iranian drones. In that case, there was a decision by the Security Council that imposed non–proliferation of weapons on Iran. So Russia is not only blocking decisions but also violating adopted decisions, by receiving military assistance and materials from Iran — a direct violation of UN sanctions against the Iranian regime. We demanded that the UN send an inspector to investigate the Iranian drones to confirm their origin, and, by doing so, confirm that Russia violated the Security Council resolution on Iran. But Russia blackmailed both the Security Council and the Secretary General, because it is up to the Secretary General to launch such an investigation. In doing so, Russia undermined the Security Council, the institution that imposed the sanctions, which has implications well beyond the current war. It sets a dangerous precedent that the Security Council can be disregarded.
Is there one thing that you feel people misunderstand about the conflict or your work in the United Nations?
First of all, I want to say that I’m very grateful to the people of the United States because I believe there is very strong support among Americans for Ukraine, for the defense of its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and its desire to remain an independent and free nation. Of course, the United States is a democratic nation. And, indeed, in a democratic nation, there are always a variety of opinions. What I would appreciate is if all those opinions were well informed and based not on misleading facts and disinformation. For an average American who is otherwise a very good citizen, to spend time learning about international relations and the United Nations requires quite an effort.
I think it is the duty of every government to provide all its citizens with unimpeded access to verified information. It’s not about indoctrinating citizens. It’s about letting citizens make their own decisions, based on truth and verified information. I think the only thing that disappoints me when it comes to Americans, as with many Europeans, is that often they are –– we all are –– misled by disinformation. And, as you know, the Russians are very capable spreaders of disinformation. Russia is not bound by any ethics, and as a result we are losing the battle on disinformation.