For 17 years, Joanna Lillis has worked in Kazakhstan as a journalist for publications like The Guardian and The Economist. She has become one of the foremost writers covering Central Asian affairs and is the author of a book on the complex Kazakh political system.
Yet Lillis has never seen Kazakhstan like this. When she glances out of her window, thousands of new faces pass by on the streets below.
“It’s obvious where I am in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, because you can just see that there are more Russians around on the street,” Lillis said.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of Russian migrants poured into neighboring countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This influx has impacted Central Asian politics and culture, and Kazakhstan in particular has received a dramatic flood of new Russian residents.
Kazakhstan and Russia have had a long-standing and intimate relationship. Rus’ people first began to populate present-day Kazakhstan in the 16th century, and cultural, social, religious, and economic ties endured. The Russian language and culture have a notable presence in Kazakhstan to this day.
The recent migration is undoubtedly the largest move of Russian people into Kazakhstan since the Soviet Union dissolved. Migrants are often either young Russian men evading military conscription or politically-conscientious objectors to Russia’s unlawful invasion. Lillis laughed as she talked about the differences between the new Russian migrants and the Kazakh people. While the two can be difficult to tell apart by physical features alone, Lillis said that identifying the difference is remarkably easy.
“There are all kinds of funny stories that people are telling, saying, ‘Oh, I know they were Russian because of X Y, Z,” she said. “People know because Russians can’t pronounce the name of the currency, for example. It’s pronounced ‘tin-gher,’ but they pronounce it ‘ten-gay.’ And friends of mine were joking that you would only see Russians wear shorts and sandals in October.”
On the whole, the Central Asian response to this influx has been relatively warm. Kazakhs, according to Lillis, are largely sympathetic to the Russian migrants and have welcomed their new neighbors. This is especially true in cases where Russians have made an effort to assimilate into their host cultures.
“We see some of the more sensitive Russians actually joining Kazakh language clubs. Some of the new arrivals are trying to learn a bit of Kazakh,” Lillis said.
However, the Russians who make the effort to get involved in cultural efforts such as Kazakh language clubs are perhaps a minority. Many Russian migrants do not see the need to assimilate into Kazakh culture — an outlook that can spark resentment.
“Russians tend to have quite a colonial mentality about the use of Russian and tend to just blast away in Russian, impervious to what effect they are having on people. And these things are so very sensitive,” Lillis said.
Indeed, this colonial mentality has a long history. Claire Roosien, a Yale professor who teaches in the Slavic Languages and Literatures Department and specializes in modern Eurasia, emphasized that the history of the Soviet Union has left many Russians with a lingering colonial mindset.
“Throughout the Soviet period, if you were Russian, you were entitled to speak Russian anywhere in the Soviet Union. There was a real sense of colonial entitlement on the part of Russian speakers,” Roosien said. “That kind of mentality seems to persist even among the people who are currently fleeing to Central Asia. Despite their opposition-mindedness, in some cases, they tend to hold on to long-standing colonial entitlement.”
Russian migration into Kazakhstan, however, has transformed more than just Kazakhstan’s culture. It has had real practical effects on the Kazakh people and economy, too. Leyla Latypova, an independent journalist who writes about Russian affairs, emphasized that there are marked economic distinctions between the new Russian migrants and many of those living in Central Asia.
“Russians who do have the opportunity to leave the country — they have money. The most vulnerable groups from the villages, they cannot possibly escape mobilization or the draft like that,” Latypova said. “So it’s mostly groups like Russian IT [workers]. That’s the prime emigration group, and they get paid very well.”
The arrival of tens of thousands of wealthy Russian emigrants in countries like Kazakhstan has caused massive economic upheaval. Because of their relative wealth, these migrants can pay more for housing and goods than many local Kazakhs. In response to the influx, Kazakhstan’s central bank has raised interest rates to their highest level in six years in an attempt to curb skyrocketing inflation.
The economic turmoil is also affecting Kazakhs in their homes. Suddenly, people who have lived in apartments for their whole lives are being evicted in favor of wealthier Russian tenants. Lillis has seen this effect firsthand in Almaty.
“The rent price rises have been massive. They went up by about 25 to 30% in the northern towns along the border in the immediate aftermath of the Ukrainian invasion,” Lillis said. “There is lots of anecdotal evidence of people being thrown out of their flats to make room for Russians who can pay more. I know people this has happened to. Landlords say, ‘Right, you’re out tomorrow, because I have a better client.’”
Kazakhs also worry that the housing market will affect the entire population, including younger generations. In particular, young people seeking educational opportunities have been unable to find housing, forcing them to leave school.
“Students have been evicted, lots of them,” Lillis said. “Almaty is a big student town. I’ve heard of people not being able to pursue their studies because they have to leave the city and go to their parents. They can’t afford to live here.”
Rent hikes may only be the tip of the financial iceberg. Lillis noted that Kazakhs are also concerned about the migrants’ effects on the job market. While some Russians are choosing to continue teleworking for their Russian jobs, Kazakhs fear that some will have to take jobs in Central Asia.
“People like electricians, hairdressers, you can’t do that by distance. So there will be pressure also on the job market. And the people are worried about that,” Lillis said.
Latypova and Lillis both feel that this economic tension will have great long-term repercussions. Inflation caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine may prevent Kazakhs from paying for necessary goods, leaving many without homes and essentials. These domestic economic hardships may reshape Central Asian governments’ complex policy toward Russia.
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The dynamic between Russia and Kazakhstan — in fact, between Russia and most of Central Asia — has long been defined by both reliance and fear. Central Asian countries are constantly aware of their tenuous position as former Soviet territories, and they worry about renewed aggression from their powerful neighbor to the north.
These fears are not unfounded. The war in Ukraine is not the first instance of Russian incursion into former Soviet territory. Russia also launched attacks against Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Some scholars argue that the Ukrainian invasion is part of a legacy of Russian attempts to reconstitute the Soviet Union in Central Asia. The Ukrainian invasion is part of this trend — one that worries some Central Asian policymakers.
“We have to remember that the Soviet Union was an empire. Central Asian nations, for the longest time, just like Ukraine and Belarus, have lived under this fear that something might happen to them,” Latypova said. After the invasion, she added, “there is of course solidarity with Ukrainian people, but then there is also being, like, ‘Oh, my God, they’re literally at our border too. What precludes them from coming toward us?’”
Nonetheless, the fear that characterizes this relationship is only part of the story. It works in tandem with a long history of partnership and reliance. Central Asia and Russia are inexorably tied — culturally, historically, and practically.
“Central Asian republics are very, very dependent on Russia. It’s a legacy of the Soviet period,” Roosien said. “For example, a huge part of the Tajikistan economy is remittances from migrant workers in Russia. Central Asian governments depend on the Russian military for training and equipment. And a lot of Central Asian governments are dependent on both Russia and Ukraine for grain imports, so they don’t want to completely alienate themselves from Russia.”
The Ukrainian invasion has had a double effect. On one hand, it heightened the fear that has always permeated Central Asian-Russian relations. But it has also undermined some of the region’s ability to depend on its imperial neighbor. Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russia has historically been motivated by economic need. However, because of the Ukrainian invasion, Russia’s capacity to provide economic aid to Central Asia has declined. Western sanctions have further limited its resources. Central Asian leaders question whether Russia will be able to offer the same economic assistance and assurance that it once could.
“A lot of the fear on the part of [Central Asian] government officials seems to be not just ‘Will Russia invade?’ but actually the reverse: ‘Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine take away from resources that we’ve been getting from Russia?’” Roosien said.
Central Asian countries have already taken some subtle steps toward creating distance in their relationship with Russia. At the United Nations General Assembly meeting on March 2, no Central Asian country endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have also refused to return Russian migrants who fled the draft.
At a summit on Central Asian issues on October 14, the president of Tajikistan launched into a seven-minute tirade lambasting Russia for its lack of “respect” for Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries. It was a major step in signaling defiance against Russia. The speech was an outpouring of frustration, and many pundits took it as a serious sign that Asian policymakers were fed up with Moscow.
“I don’t want to exaggerate the pivot away, but there’s definitely a reorientation of foreign policy . . . And it’s very obvious,” Lillis said. “I think what’s really driving the distance between Russia and Kazakhstan is a concern by the president and his team about the potential repercussions of the war in Ukraine for respect for borders in the post-Soviet region, which Russia has torn up.”
Amid these stories, it is important to remember that this shift remains subtle. Central Asia is far from ready to completely denounce its historical patron. The ties between the two regions are still strong.
“We should not underestimate the linguistic, cultural, and historical influence Russia has had,” Lillis said. “There are many ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and in the wider Central Asian region who don’t want to cut ties.”
In fact, some have viewed the president of Tajikistan’s rant differently, noting that the president was not demanding independence or greater autonomy from Russia. Rather, he was pleading for more Russian support.
“The tirade has been interpreted in different ways: both as evidence of resistance against Putin and also as an expression of dependency on Putin,” Roosien said. “He was begging Putin for more resources and more support.”
Roosien argued that Central Asian countries are not simply bucking their Russian ally. Instead, she feels that Central Asian policymakers are keeping their options open, making sure not to upset any potential future patrons.
“They want to stay on everyone’s good side. Many Central Asian governments are dependent on Russia, but they’re also dependent on China, and they’re dependent on the West, and they want to maintain good relationships with all of these countries,” Roosien said. “As Russia becomes more and more of a pariah, they need to distance themselves from Russia to the extent that they can in order to maintain friendly relations with other countries. It’s been a very delicate balancing act.”
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If Central Asia and Russia continue to drift apart, some have predicted that other powers could step in. To Latypova, the United States and other NATO-allied countries are major contenders. Turkey may also look to expand its influence.
“[Turkey’s President] Erdogan is very smart and witty when it comes to his whole idea of Pan-Turkism. Turkey does have much more to offer than most of the partners in the region. I think we need to really watch that space and see if they will try to weigh in and do something,” Latypova said.
Meanwhile, many see China, with its geographical positioning in the region as well as its growing economic and political power, as the natural successor to Russia’s legacy. “I do see China getting stronger [in the region],” Lillis said. “In recent diplomatic visits in our region involving Xi Jinping and Putin, we saw that Xi looked more powerful, and Putin looked on the backfoot.”
It is uncertain whether a new power will take Russia’s place. Many Kazakhs and Central Asians at large still retain favorable views toward Russia. One Almaty poll conducted in July 2022 found that 39% of Kazakhs approved of Russia’s military campaigns. Only 10% expressed solidarity with Ukraine. No matter what Central Asian policy makers feel about their historic partner, most citizens express support for closer ties with Moscow.
The future of the partnership between Russia and Central Asia is unclear. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its effects demonstrate the complex nature of the alliances.