On June 13, 2009, hundreds of thousands of Iranians poured into the streets of Tehran to protest a corrupt presidential election. Over the next six months, the protests evolved from random demonstrations to a coordinated nationwide resistance to the Iranian regime. This outburst of political activism — known as the “Green Movement” — was driven by internet-based organizing. Iranian Internet usage jumped from 34% in 2008 to 48% in 2009, and mobile phone subscriptions increased from 59% to 72% of the population. Twitter posts and videos from citizen journalists chronicled the movement, expanding participation in Iran and attracting international attention to the cause. For the first time, people within Iran and across the globe used online information to witness real-time developments, coordinate protests, and generate support for a grassroots opposition movement. Though ultimately unsuccessful — the Iranian regime eventually subdued the protests — the Green Movement marks a significant development in the use of the internet and social media in conflict.
The Iranian protesters used digital information as a weapon for democracy and freedom to be used against tyranny and corruption. Over the last decade, however, this weapon has been used most effectively not by democracies and freedom fighters but instead by tyrants and totalitarian regimes. Russia, in particular, has found success in spreading false narratives that have divided and destabilized Western powers. For example, in 2016, the Russians launched disinformation campaigns that affected both the presidential election in the United States and the Brexit Referendum in Britain.
Pointing to these examples and others, Asha Rangappa — a counterintelligence expert and CNN national security analyst — told The Politic that Russia has maintained an asymmetrical advantage on the information battlefield in the past and that the West has been trying to play catch-up for a long time. But why has Russia had the advantage? Why are examples of social media being used in defense of democracy like in Iran exceptions to what has been a Russian-dominated information space? Rangappa believes the answers to these questions are rooted in the fact that “Russia approaches the information space as a battlefield, whereas the West largely has not.” She explained that the West is used to “clear divisions between military and non-military action” and has not been accustomed to operating in “hybrid warfare.”
But, in late February and early March of 2022, as Ukraine and its Western allies took to the internet to generate support and coordinate defense efforts in the face of a Russian invasion, Russia’s chokehold on the information space loosened. Just as the Iranian protesters used Twitter to attract attention to their protests, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used Twitter to attract attention to his own cause during the early part of the Russian-Ukraine war. As Russian forces moved into the outskirts of Kyiv in early March, Zelenskyy posted a video to his Twitter: “I am here. We will not lay down any weapons. We will defend our state because our weapons are our truth. Our truth is that this is our land, our country, our children and we will protect all of this.” On the same day the video was posted, France reversed their policy on sending military aid to Ukraine and agreed to ship military equipment for the Ukrainian defense. To this, Zelenskyy responded via Twitter, “A new day on the diplomatic frontline began with a conversation with @EmmanuelMacron. Weapons and equipment from our partners are on the way to Ukraine. The anti-war coalition is working!” Zelenskyy’s use of Twitter to galvanize international support for Ukraine, pressure countries to supply aid, and conduct diplomacy is one of the many ways Ukrainians have have instrumentalized social media in defense of their cause in the early part of this war.
Russia has acted no differently in the digital information space during the invasion than it has during past crises — Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to disseminate false-narratives and sow confusion and instability across social media platforms and state media outlets. But, this time, the West has used information to push back against Russian disinformation. In the early part of this war, democracies are showing that they have finally learned how to approach the information space as a battlefield. Throughout their early successes, Ukraine and its allies have utilized not only Twitter and other social media platforms to generate public support, but also what is known as “open-source intelligence” or “OSINT” to track Russian movements and coordinate their defense. OSINT, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, is “intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.” This publicly available information used as intelligence has spanned from Tik Tok videos of Russian tank movements to satellite imagery of Russian missile strikes, which has allowed Ukraine and its allies to explain exactly what has happened with the general public.
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In order to understand more about the vital role OSINT is playing in Ukraine’s digital information battle against Russia, it is crucial to understand the background and history of OSINT. While the internet has increased the amount of information available, OSINT is not a new concept. The methodical application of open-source intelligence began in the United States after Pearl Harbor in 1941. The U.S. Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) institutionalized the method of monitoring domestic and foreign media during the Second World War. The practice then became embedded in the U.S. intelligence apparatus following the establishment of the CIA in 1947. Since then, two conflicts have reshaped the usage and value of open-source intelligence: the Cold War and the War on Terror. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States relied heavily on open-source intelligence. According to former CIA analyst Stephen Mercado, OSINT became the “leading source of information” for U.S. intelligence during the conflict. The attacks of 9/11, coupled with the advent of social media, caused OSINT to be further integrated into U.S. intelligence efforts. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005 required that U.S. intelligence services increase their use of OSINT and created the Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center.
Since 2005, open-source intelligence and social media have together come to dominate modern conflict. Craig Nazareth, a digital information and intelligence expert at the University of Arizona College of Applied Science and Technology, told The Politic, “Government OSINT typically provides 90% of the intelligence used for policymaking and national security-related decisions.” In Ukraine, Professor Zazareth explained, OSINT is playing an especially important role: “Journalists, social media users, and Ukrainian cell phone users at the front lines are capturing useful information that would not otherwise be available to U.S. drones or satellites.” Tracking the evolution of OSINT in modern conflict up to its most recent usage in Ukraine provides insight into how digital information has changed warfare and how democracies across the world can use it to their advantage in the future.
In 2011, Nathaniel Raymond, a human rights and communication technologies expert who lectures at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, conducted an operation known as the Satellite Sentinel Project in South Sudan. His objective was to use satellite imagery in conjunction with field reports to examine mass atrocities being committed and prevent further atrocities by focusing the world’s attention on the Sudanese conflict. Raymond and his colleagues at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative examined satellite images of “tukuls” — round homes made of mud — in South-Sudan to see how many were being burned and destroyed. Through this satellite imagery, the project was able to evaluate the extent of mass atrocities committed, predict future attacks, and most importantly (but tragically) provide evidence of the digging of mass graves in anticipation of future mass killings.
This initiative marked the first time that a sustained public effort monitored security threats through satellite imagery with the aim of real-time deterrence of human rights violations. And, it is now being used again to track civilian destruction and atrocities in Ukraine. As Russians encircled the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol in early March, satellite images depicted fires and significant damage done to residences. These images have informed where officials send military aid, helped them to organize humanitarian relief efforts, and provided a window for the world into the atrocities being committed in Ukraine.
The Satellite Sentinel Project in Sudan, like the Green Movement in Iran, reveals more of the power of digital information as a weapon for promoting and protecting truth and democracy. But they are both isolated examples of success. What has made Ukraine a turning point in information warfare is not a single video, satellite image, or Tweet, but rather a coordinated, tactical, information campaign throughout the Russian military buildup and early part of the invasion.
So, what exactly has that looked like? What makes this a defining moment for the West in information warfare?
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In early January, officials in the Biden administration stood before the American public and told them everything they knew about the Russian military buildup on the Ukrainian border. They were waging information warfare in a completely unprecedented way. Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor to President Biden, appeared daily on news shows, providing detailed descriptions of Russian troop movements, specific types of weapons, and training exercises. American officials even provided evidence of “blood supplies” being transported to the Ukrainian border to show that this buildup was far more than merely a precautionary measure or show of force.
Raymond contextualized the objectives of this American media campaign. There are, Raymond said, four important areas in which open-source intelligence and media information can be used by governments during a conflict such as the invasion of Ukraine: early warning, evidence collection of digital sources for future accountability, retrospective corroboration, and means assessment/logistics planning.
The Biden administration’s digital information tactics, starting with the military buildup and continuing through the invasion fit into these categories and, strung together, comprise a clever and effective digital information strike on Russia.
The initial U.S. media transparency and “early warning” of Putin’s intentions were crucial to the defense of Ukraine multiple ways. First, it thwarted Putin’s ability to create false pretexts for the invasion and garner local and international support for a Russian attack. Because the United States repeatedly emphasized and provided evidence for Putin’s plans to invade, it made it much harder for Russian state media to plant narratives of Ukrainian violence or antagonism as justifications for a Russian invasion. Second, it hardened the resolve of Ukrainians. Oleksii Antoniuk ’24 is a Ukrainian student who is President of the Ukrainian House of Yale. On February 22, days before the invasion, he told The Politic that through the transparent presentation of the crisis, friends and family back home did not believe any of Putin’s falsehoods, knew an invasion was coming, and that “Ukrainians were absolutely going to fight.” A quick invasion and destruction of Ukraine were never possible because the people knew it was coming. Third, OSINT chronicling the military buildup and likely imminent invasion allowed countries across the globe to put themselves in a position to respond. The minute Russian troops crossed into Ukraine, Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia and increased military aid to Ukraine. In a matter of days, an unprecedented international coalition stood firm against Russia.
Though they may appear to be limited to hindsight, we can also see how the next two categories — “evidence collection” and “retrospective collaboration” — played a role early in the invasion. Everything that Putin is doing is being captured either by cell phones or satellites, and those cell phone videos and satellite images will exist in databases long after the invasion is over. This permanence of digital information makes it much harder for Putin to break international laws, commit atrocities, and then try to reframe his actions after the fact. For example, as a 40-mile-long Russian convoy moved slowly south towards Kyiv, the fusion of on-the-ground reporting and OSINT tracked its exact movements. Officials now have a record of every move the convoy made and every action it took. This digital record of the convoy and the war as a whole can and will be used to hold leaders accountable and ensure that history tells the true, complete story of the invasion.
The final category — means assessment and logistics planning — is where OSINT and digital information have most directly impacted the West’s ability to influence the war. Agencies, whether they are foreign governments, humanitarian organizations, or NGOs, cannot get assessment teams on the ground during war but they still need to know what is needed where at what time. And for those objectives, they rely on OSINT. By examining Whatsapp texts, social media posts, phone traffic, and satellite imagery, humanitarian organizations have been able to follow the flow of refugees throughout Ukraine and provide aid where needed. On March 9, 40,000 Ukrainians were evacuated out of harm’s way, according to a Facebook post from Ukrainian politician David Braun. And by examining real-time satellite imagery and on-the-ground reports, the Ukrainian military has known where to move troops and weapons systems most effectively.
Ukrainian allies have also been able to quickly determine the country’s needs and meet them. The Dutch have sent rocket launchers for air defense. The Estonians have sent Javelin anti-tank missiles. The Poles and the Latvians have sent Stinger surface-to-air missiles. The Czechs have sent machine guns, sniper rifles, pistols and ammunition. The list of 20 NATO countries filling specific Ukrainian military needs goes on — and their ability to do so hinges on the data and information that they can collect in real-time.
Ukraine’s use of digital information in each of these four categories has been tactical and impressive. But Raymond also pointed out, “Russia can and has been doing the same thing.” And as we have seen, they have traditionally done it better than anyone else. But in the early part of this war, Ukraine has mounted a surprisingly strong military defense and the West has formed a surprisingly cohesive coalition against Russia. Can these early victories be attributed to factors outside of the digital information battlefield? Or are Ukraine and its allies truly learning from their previous mistakes and beating Putin at his own game?
Rangappa believes that, at least early in the war, the West really is “finally learning to fight the information war” against Russia. Rangappa said that this progress can be partially explained by how we approach the concept of “reflexive control,” which she defined as “the ability to feed adversaries certain assumptions to get them to act in a certain way.”
For the past decade, Russia has utilized online information to exact this reflexive control over its enemies, leading them to take steps that they think are in their own interests but that actually benefit the Russians. In February 2013, General Valery Gerasimov — Russia’s chief of the General Staff — published a pamphlet titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” in the weekly Russian trade paper Military-Industrial Kurier. Now referred to as “The Gerasimov Doctrine,” the paper explains how the Russian military can utilize online information to exert reflexive control over enemy targets and level the warfare playing field with adversaries such as the United States and Britain who have more advanced militaries, technologies, and economies.
In Ukraine, the United States engaged directly with the Russian tactic of reflexive control — largely by employing Raymond’s idea of “early warning.” American officials preempted and neutralized Russian reflexive control — they had, in a sense, won a crucial battle in the digital information space.
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So, what can we learn from the successful Western engagement on the information battlefield in the early part of this war that might prove helpful in future information battles?
First, action beats reaction. Rangappa identified one weapon that is most effective in defending against disinformation campaigns: “the truth.” But the challenge then becomes getting the truth out before the lies. In Ukraine, the West did this successfully — American officials delivered transparent, truthful messages to the public before false narratives gained traction. This preemptive information strike successfully neutralized Russian digital attacks and modeled how a timely delivery of truth can defend citizens against disinformation.
Second, ordinary citizens are now military targets. Another point that Rangappa stressed is that, unlike traditional warfare, civilians become military targets on the information battlefield. The primary objective of disinformation campaigns is to exact Geramisov’s concept of reflexive control on civilian targets, coercing them to act in a way that helps their enemy. In addition to striking first, governments must also inoculate their citizens against these attempts at reflexive control.The general public needs to know how to authenticate videos, vet sources, and understand that when they share unverified posts online, they could be acting as unwitting agents in an information war.
Third, credibility is crucial. In his analysis of modern uses of OSINT, Nazareth noted that the information conveyed to the public is only valuable so long as people actually believe it. That is, preemptive information strikes and education on authentication and source vetting are only effective if people trust the government officials and media platforms reporting real, truthful news. A Gallup Poll in 2020 concluded that 9% of people in the U.S. trust their media “a great deal,” 31% “a fair amount,” 27% have “not very much” trust, and 33% have “none at all.” To prevent Russia and other bad actors from exacting reflexive control over their targets, Western nations must establish credible lines of communication with the public. This means that politicians and partisan networks telling fibs and stretching truths are no longer just unfortunate parts of politics. They are, instead, a national security concern. It undermines the trust in the information the public receives and leaves them vulnerable to disinformation campaigns.
Ukraine is just one information battle. Understanding and improving in these three areas is what will win the information war.