I. The Ukrainian Dispute Through Historical Beginnings
History is retrospectively nothing more than the start and end dates of humankind’s most noteworthy accomplishments. Drawing from records and testimonies, scholars compose chronological accounts of how each event fits into a surrounding spatio-temporal context. But what happens when we can’t agree on a start or end?
This dilemma is at the heart of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin maintains that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the most catastrophic event of the 20th century and has even written an influential essay arguing that the Ukrainian and Russian people are historically inseparable. Putin claims that, despite the 13th century Mongol invasion that fragmented the inhabitants of the Ancient Rus, once the largest state in Europe, they retained the same language and religious tradition.
Certain historians disagree. Many Ukrainian ideologues frame Ukraine’s roots as a constant struggle against a nearby Russian power that culminated with its detachment from the Soviet Union in 1991. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, widely regarded as the founder of Ukrainian historiography, went so far as to propose that Russian-speaking peoples emerged after the Ukrainian state was informally established.
Putin is clearly unwilling to deliberate over these arguments. Not only does Ukraine share many indisputable linguistic and cultural ties to Russia, but it would also represent a favorable geostrategic acquisition. Situated between key Western adversaries and the Russian heartland, and not yet a member of the European Union, Ukraine is in a geographically ideal position. Putin has chosen an identical start date for the two states and extols the days when they were unified under the Soviet Union, notwithstanding recent polling that increasingly suggests that Ukrainian citizens consider themselves as a distinct nation and are resistant to the idea of being allied with Russia.
Certain experts point out, however, that language and culture are fundamentally flawed metrics for determining whether two territories should unite. Dr. Hanna Shelest, Director of Security Programmes at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism,” noted that Spanish and Italian are about as similar to one another as Ukrainian and Russian are, and that the Ukrainian language is closer to Polish. What matters most are the significant differences in “traditions, gender attitudes, [and] values perceptions” between Ukraine and Russia, according to Shelest. Putin is willing to overlook this incompatibility to gain a geostrategic advantage.
II. Motivations and Movements
Putin’s actions, while reinforced by a Russian nationalist ideology, are principally driven by his desire to assert Russian supremacy over the international sphere while countering efforts to expand democratic processes. For the past few decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has continued to expand eastward and Russia has been limited in its ability to dissuade nearby European countries from joining. Incorporating Ukraine crosses an unacceptable boundary. In this way, the debate over Ukraine’s origins and international preeminence are directly linked in Putin’s eyes. According to Dr. Yoshiko Herrera, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Putin’s main priority is to signal to other countries that “he will not sit by and watch the further expansion of NATO.” Rather, he desires a “new world order where Russian interests are respected.”
These motivations partly explain the recent troop build-up that has alarmed European and American leaders and initiated multiforum negotiations. Over 100,000 Russian troops have assembled at three key fronts along the Ukrainian border. Nobody can be sure of Moscow’s exact intentions: The forces may be the harbinger of a Russian military invasion just as they could be a way to attract attention to seek diplomatic gains or recognition.
An invasion would not be unprecedented. In 2013, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych abruptly backtracked on his commitment to sign the Association Agreement, which would have facilitated Ukraine’s gradual integration into the European Union (EU). Outrage over the reversal sparked the Maidan Revolution, an immense protest which included opposition party leaders, students, and disillusioned citizens. Russian troops, garrisoned throughout Crimea, capitalized on the instability to seize the region, forcing an illegal annexation which violated a number of previously signed agreements during the Soviet era.
Nevertheless, Ukraine and Crimea are not exactly comparable. Putin’s move to seize Crimea garnered popularity in Russia because the territory was previously an established part of the Russian empire and its transfer to Ukraine was perceived as an unfortunate historical accident by many, though not all Russian citizens, Herrera explained. “While Putin’s actions in 2022 are in some ways a repeat of Russia’s 2014 lack of respect of Ukrainian sovereignty, the ongoing war since 2014 in eastern Ukraine has been unpopular in Russia,” said Herrera. This year, the U.S., Europe, and NATO have made it clear that they will react strongly to any further Russian encroachment, which makes the international situation considerably different than in 2014, according to Dr. Herrera.
Invading all of Ukraine would severely damage Putin’s domestic popularity. Russia would face resistance from the moment it captured Ukraine, and in order to execute such an operation, Russian troops would have to sacrifice their lives on the battlefield, a prospect that ordinary citizens certainly want to avoid. As Seth Cropsey, Director of the Center for American Seapower at Hudson Institute, framed it: “Russians don’t like their sons to be brought back in body bags any more than Americans do… No one needs a war under any circumstances. When you start a war, you never know what’s going to happen.”
III. Putin’s Personal Stake
In any case, international outcry failed to budge Putin’s resolve when he annexed Crimea in 2014. The same seems to be happening now. “At the moment, we have a situation where Putin’s evident personal emotional investment in the issue might be working against Russia’s national interests,” said Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow at the Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme.
Indeed, Putin bears a strong grudge against Ukraine because of past failed attempts to unite the country with Russia. In 2004, he led an operation to deploy Russian troops in Ukraine amidst a cataclysmic election that pitted a pro-Western candidate with a politician favorable to Moscow. Citing flagrant fraud, Ukrainians had taken to the street to protest the latter’s victory in what became known as the Orange Revolution. Putin sought to take advantage of the chaos, and one of his top aides accused the United States of challenging “the strength of post-Soviet territory.” Ukraine refused to accept such a label and corresponded with Russia regarding its explicit partiality during the election. Yushchenko, who advocated for stronger ties with Europe, ultimately prevailed despite the suspicious Russian activities.
Confronted with little opposition when annexing Crimea a decade later, Putin has not let go of his precious crown jewel. But does this necessarily signal an invasion? Or does Putin have other ambitions that reach beyond just Ukraine? Onlookers have provided arguments for both possibilities.
IV. An Invasion on the Horizon
Dr. William Galston, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, grounds his approach on Putin’s past statements and written documents. Based on the aforementioned essay Putin wrote discussing the two countries’ historical overlap, Galston said that “Putin genuinely believes that Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine are one country and that their division into three countries is an artificial development that he would like to reverse.” Galston believes that his ultimate objective is to reintegrate Ukraine and Belarus into Russia, though this does not necessarily have to take the form of a violent military invasion. The three countries could then exist as a “confederation with one big brother,” Galston suggested.
The problem that Putin is now faced with, according to Galston, is that he has locked himself in a position where he cannot renege from force. “He has gone all in, he is fully committed. To back down now without getting something substantial would be a huge blow… He might be forced to resort to force in some way,” said Galston, who has reported on the ongoing crisis in his weekly Politics & Ideas column for the Wall Street Journal.
Dr. John Deni, Research Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College, agrees with this assessment. Since Western countries agreed to engage in diplomatic talks demanded by Russia in the first place, it would be nonsensical for Putin to say that force is the only alternative and that the discourse achieved nothing. Moreover, Deni points out that since Ukraine continues to receive military backing from the U.S. and is shifting towards a European identity, Putin may want to act before it is too late. “Ukraine from a strategic and even cultural perspective is increasingly lost to him.”
In general, Putin’s decisions will be motivated by his desire to bolster his public approval rating in Russia. While some onlookers believe that forgoing violence will help Putin in this regard, Deni believes that his domestic popularity may explain why Putin is unlikely to stem the troop build-up. “Given Putin’s domestic challenges, I doubt the Kremlin will choose [de-escalation] because [it is] not as likely to strengthen Putin domestically as much as open confrontation will,” Deni recently wrote in an article for the Atlantic Council.
There is also the possibility that Putin is trying to squeeze out the most amount of concessions possible from the United States and NATO by making extraordinarily credible threats but not acting on them. Bryan Clark, director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute, said that Russia would have moved more quickly like they did in Crimea if they were set on invasion. Clark cited AUKUS’s failed rollout, Biden’s domestic unpopularity, and Germany’s left-leaning government as reasons why Putin may find this moment opportune. He is still working to gain “concessions from the U.S. on deploying long-range missiles in Eastern Europe” as well as seeking to permanently extend Russian control to the Donbas and the land bridge to Crimea, according to Clark.
V. A Battle Already Won
Other experts interpret the deliberations in Vienna as already being a sign of geostrategic victory for Putin. Giles explained that Moscow frequently employs military threats to emphasize its claims to certain territories and have diplomatic talks focused on Russian issues. “The very fact that negotiations are underway is a success for Russia — it is legitimizing their demands,” Giles said.
Without escalating the deployment of troops along the Ukrainian border, Russia would not have seized the attention of chief executives, military officials, and media outlets across the world to the same degree. Russia has framed the talks around its own security instead of focusing the conversation around Ukraine’s shift toward a European identity since this would undermine their increasing bellicosity. Giles regrets that NATO leaders were so quick to accept multiforum deliberations with Russia since it shows that “the threat of military force is the best way to start a conversation.” Keeping in mind that Moscow’s ultimate intention might not be a direct invasion, however, it is possible that Putin may have already fulfilled some of his goals. Without losing a single soldier’s life thus far, he has “reasserted Russian power globally,” said Cropsey.
Herrera does not believe that the diplomatic talks in themselves represent a Russian victory. She explained that Russia was likely emboldened to act due to its involvement in the Syrian civil war, the U.S.’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, and other problems in U.S. domestic politics, but the irony is that there is some basis for shared interests. Neither NATO nor the EU were intending to admit Ukraine to their organization anytime in the near future. Russia wants to take this commitment one step further — the near future is not enough. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov made this sentiment clear after a press conference on January 10, 2022. “For us, it’s absolutely mandatory to make sure that Ukraine never, never, ever becomes a member of NATO,” he stated. Russia will not passively allow NATO to pursue its expansion as it has done in decades past.
Shelest agrees that the extensive talks do not represent an a priori Russian victory, but that they have certainly aided the Kremlin in achieving what she perceives to be its ultimate goal: “confusion among allies and uncertainty.” According to Shelest, Russia “knew from the very beginning that NATO and the U.S. would not agree to their conditions;” all it needed to do was present itself as a victim to NATO’s expansion before taking military action.
VI. Russian Limitations
While Russia has succeeded in reasserting its power and capturing the world’s attention, one major factor will limit its military potential in the coming years: its economy. Compared to China, which has seen impressive expansions in its GDP in recent decades to make it one of the leading global economies, Russia is restricted by its dependence on certain resources which occasionally lie in the hands of adversarial countries.
Natural gas and oil are the underlying powerhouses of Russia’s military might. One of the leading producers of both, Russia is only able to finance its military operations when their prices rise and stay high. This will eventually pose a problem for the Kremlin because its rivals have the most amount of market power in these areas. “We know that the Russian oil and gas sectors are suffering from a lack of Western investment. Russians desperately need Western modernization and investment,” said Deni, which seems to run counter to the country’s current approach to Ukraine.
While this dependence has not impeded Russia’s plans in the short term, it is increasingly clear that Putin will face long-term consequences if he cannot take advantage of foreign markets and if hostile relations with Europe endure. Germany, for instance, has already corresponded with the United States about shutting down the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that carries natural gas into Russia in the event of a Ukrainian invasion. This would be a “huge setback” for Moscow, especially if Germany makes the retaliatory decision permanent, Galston said.
This type of economic exclusion does not only apply to Western countries. Russia risks being shut out of negotiations with sympathetic powers if it is not able to adapt to shifting industrial markets. China has traditionally been a major consumer of Russian military hardware. Recently, however, the Chinese have been increasingly copying Russian technology and developing it themselves. “The Russians are going to see China as a declining market for their military hardware services,” Deni said.
Deni also points out that Russia’s birth and death rates stalled in the 2010s before “going in the wrong direction” in the past decade. Generally, for a country to see military growth, its population and economy must flourish, which does not appear to be the case for Russia in the next few decades. This may explain why Russia has spearheaded initiatives to begin military training for youth and expand its citizen recruitment through state media channels, but it is still unclear whether these remedies will attenuate the consequences of being dependent on natural resources.
Finally, beyond domestic preoccupations, Russia is also entangled in foreign policy concerns that are forcing it to divide its attention. The most pertinent example is with respect to Kazakhstan, which lies just south of Russia. Protests have sparked there for two main reasons: the president’s failure to address financial corruption as promised and the suppression of basic civil rights. The latter issue stems from political leaders’ ties with Russia, since Putin wants to ensure that the former Soviet territory does not adopt problematic democratic behaviors. Russian forces were deployed in Kazakhstan to address the protests which signal that Russia cannot unilaterally direct its focus toward Ukraine. Citizens of countries that remain under Russian influence are expressing discontent, and despite being limited in their capacity to introduce change, they can distract Russia and inspire their neighbors to act likewise.
Overlooking these multitudinous uprisings would be a grave mistake for Russia. Paired with domestic demographic and economic concerns, the Kremlin is in the midst of its own balancing act as it contemplates invading Ukraine. This may mean that Russia will not be able to dedicate the totality of its financial and military resources to Ukraine, which will inhibit its capacity to execute a successful invasion.
VII. The American Response: Prioritizing Taiwan
What role should the United States play in responding to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, if any? The Department of Defense is faced with threats on two fronts, which complicates the situation. To the west of the United States, China continues to place pressure on Taiwan by undermining the median line and conducting military exercises near the Taiwanese Strait. Committed to upholding democracy against an encroaching authoritarian state, the United States has pledged military aid to a critical ally that should be the main priority of its defense strategy.
In decades past, democratic Asian states have not significantly undergirded American efforts, leaving the United States to assume the majority of the burden when defending Taiwan. Only recently have allies like Japan begun to realize the urgency of Chinese threats. If China invades Taiwan, it would enjoy unlimited access to the central Pacific, facilitating its economic expansion and ability to access new trade routes. China’s success in Taiwan would mark the beginning of a focused and sequential strategy whereby the People’s Liberation Army would target vulnerable neighbors who have lost faith in the United States’s potential to form an anti-hegemonic coalition. Consequently, the United States must prioritize Taiwan in an age of great power competition instead of dividing its forces between two fronts as it has done in the past decade.
However, China’s approach to Taiwan is different from that of Russia’s to Ukraine. This distinction is fundamental to comprehending how the United States should respond to both crises. “Putin’s legitimacy as [the] ruler of Russia does not depend upon Ukraine. It’s more of a strategic, diplomatic issue,” explained Cropsey. Putin has revanchist ambitions and is interested in taking back a territory that used to be part of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s predecessor. Chinese president Xi Jinping, on the other hand, is concerned with unification instead of revanchism. He is taking his turn at a centuries-long “contest between the center and the centripetal forces that would detract from the [Chinese] empire,” according to Cropsey. In addition, China is not opposed by a neighboring multilateral coalition with its eyes set on Taiwan in the way that NATO protects Ukraine.
Since European countries are actively involved in Ukraine’s defense, the United States should consider this crisis as a secondary concern. NATO forces can retaliate in precise, sequential steps thanks to their geographic proximity, especially countries that border Ukraine like Poland and Bulgaria. That being said, the United States cannot completely abandon its commitment to a country weighing a democratic transition. The Department of State’s official stance is principally focused on supporting Ukraine as it experiments with new institutions and anti-corruption practices that safeguard democracy.
VIII. The American Response: What Comes Next
U.S. president Joe Biden has declared that American troops will not be deployed in the event of a conflict, though he has recently deliberated deploying troops to the Baltics. His initial decision was opposed by certain academics and military experts. It is an “absolutely disastrous thing to say…Why take that option off the table and simplify Russia’s decision-making calculation?” Giles said. Cropsey echoed this sentiment, adding that a “certain amount of strategic ambiguity is always helpful. Never say never.”
Cropsey does not, for that reason, believe that American troops must unilaterally be sent to Ukraine. This would also recreate an unambiguous situation that may spur violence. Instead, leaders such as Biden and British prime minister Boris Johnson should have remained unclear about their policies in order to complicate Russia’s assessment of the international pushback. The United States will now have to rely on harsh economic sanctions, weapons support, and coordination with NATO countries to counter Russian aggression. It will also have to be flexible and responsive in the event of veiled attacks, such as the mid-January cyber-attack that took down Ukrainian government websites.
Clark enumerated a few precise recommendations for the Biden administration. Since American advisers are already present in Ukraine, sending more to the country while supplying short-range defensive weapons would be a relatively unprovocative step. Clark explained that the United States should provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance technology to Ukraine by flying in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles like the MQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper.
Galston highlighted the importance of American action considering that the U.S. is the lynchpin of the alliance that contains Russia’s westward expansion. “If we yield to Russia in the west, lots of other things would follow, none of them good for the U.S. or for the nations that have trusted us to guarantee their security,” Galston said. He pointed out that Russia’s attempt to guarantee that Ukraine never enters NATO is a “flat-out violation” of the organization’s charter. Galston also cited the necessity of strategic ambiguity to walk the line between triggering Russian aggression and neglecting a crucial Eastern European partner.
IX. A Comprehensive Assessment
Despite the multitudinous considerations that come with any decision over Ukraine, the crisis is ultimately a debate over beginnings. Putin claims that Russia shares its heritage with Ukraine while Ukrainians who lean towards Europe propose that they significantly differ linguistically and culturally. Whether Ukraine is a product of the migrations of the Kievan Rus or the dissolution of the Soviet Union depends on the eye of the beholder. Western countries have no role in taking a side in either case.
However, onlookers like the United States should be active when it comes to undesired regime changes. If Ukrainian citizens are gradually aligning themselves with Europe, there is no reason that Russia should violate rules of sovereignty and impede its trajectory. While a significant portion of Eastern Ukrainians are more culturally aligned with Russia, it would not be in their best interest to stand by during a Russian invasion. Ukraine’s Donbas region has profited immensely from Western investment in the past few centuries and cities like Kharkiv and Dnipro lead the country in terms of exportations to the EU. Whether their fears are grounded in cultural, territorial, or economic concerns, both sides of the country would suffer from a Russian attack.
The United States must avoid taking sides concerning the debate over Ukraine’s origins while making it clear that Russia cannot continue imposing geostrategic demands through the use of force. NATO members must do all that they can to stymie a Russian invasion which would subvert Ukrainian democratization and lead to unnecessary warfare in the region. Ukraine would undoubtedly protest occupation until the day of its liberation, Putin would face catastrophic domestic consequences, and soldiers would perish on the battlefield — an outcome that benefits nobody.
Russia’s wish is for Ukraine to remain a strategic, sympathetic state bordering the EU. If NATO avoids conducting military exercises far to the east and concedes that it has no intention of allowing Ukraine to become a member — perhaps relying on some ambiguity that can be reversed in the future — this crisis can, at the very least, be attenuated. As Clark explained, “the U.S. and NATO could leave the door open [to Ukraine], but establish a path for membership that would include some way of ameliorating Russia, which could be left undefined for now.” What matters presently is reversing Russia’s unacceptable offensive measures.
Since this dispute has been ongoing for the past few centuries, Western powers must have secure defense mechanisms in place that diminish the impact of Russian military escalation. There is no reason that Russia should impose negotiations whenever it accumulates troops near the Ukrainian border — this is an unsustainable diplomatic model. Defensive forces must be prepared at all times and the West must avoid making irrevocable statements about its defense strategy. With these points in mind, the United States can channel its energy to the Taiwanese Strait while leveraging the power of its European allies to contain Russia.