Conducted by Christopher Chen

Dr. Boaz Ganor is the founder of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism and deputy dean of the Lauder School of Government and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. He is the author of several books, most recently a work entitled The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. Dr. Ganor lectures on terrorism and counterterrorism at the High Command Academic Courses of the Israel’s Defense Forces.

You argue that global jihadist terrorism is a substantial threat to the world because jihadist terrorists are motivated by what they believed to be a divine command. In your view, what can be done to combat religious fanaticism?

I believe that certain steps have to be followed in order to be able to conduct an effective counter-campaign against global jihadist terrorism. First of all, you need to understand their rationale. Some people tend to believe that terrorists, the global jihadi, are irrational—I beg to differ. I believe that they are rational, but that they have their own rationality. In other terms, the rational decision-making process is a calculation of cost and benefit and choosing the alternative, which in the eye of the beholder, is more beneficial. This is exactly what terrorists in general are doing, and also what the global Jihadists are doing. When you are trying to understand the rationalities from a worse-than-rational point of view, then it seems like an irrational phenomenon. Once you understand their rationalities, you have to acknowledge the level of danger they present. As I believe, it’s a global threat; the war is another kind of world war, but it’s not a war between religions. First and foremost, it’s a war within a religion—with global jihadists against the rest of the world—which includes the vast majority of the Muslims, who are referred to as infidels as well. Once you understand that these guys have their own rationality and that they see most of the world as their enemies, including the vast majority of Muslims like themselves, you understand the answer to your question. The way to deal with global jihadists is first and foremost an internal debate in the Muslim world. Only Muslims can educate Muslims. Only Muslims can reach out to other Muslims. This is a war of ideas—the idea and culture of global jihadists versus other cultures versus Islam itself. So in my view, the way to combat the global jihadists is only by making new international alliances which will combine the efforts of the Muslim societies of several countries and all the Muslim countries together to jointly fight the common enemy.

Examining the “Boomerang Effect” of increased terrorist retaliations in response to counterterrorism efforts, you contend that the effect exists when terror organizations have both the motivational and operational capacity to retaliate. Are there any situations in which terror organizations have possessed both capacities but refrained from retaliating?

In general, when a group of people has both the motivation to attack and the operational capability to metabolize this motivation, then a terrorist campaign will carry it out. So in general, the answer is no—if they have both factors, they will launch an attack. However, there are situations in which they may have operational capability and motivation to attack but still lack the operational or motivational capability to launch a certain type of attack, such as nonconventional terrorism. You might find an organization that has the motivation and operational capability to use regular terrorism, but is missing one of the factors for nonconventional terrorism. In general, if an organization has both types of capability, then the outcome is clear—you will suffer a terrorist attack. Still, there might be exceptions within this statement of different organizations that might refrain from a specific type of attack, from attacking a specific target, and so forth.

How do nonconventional terrorist attacks—such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks— affect society differently from conventional terrorist attacks?

Well, I usually differentiate between two types of nonconventional attacks: limited nonconventional attacks and unlimited nonconventional attacks. Limited nonconventional attacks are those where you know where they start and you know where they end. If someone were to open an anthrax letter in an office, perhaps the whole floor will be contaminated, maybe the whole building, maybe the whole street. But still, it is a limited attack—the consequences are limited. An unlimited attack is an attack like a “smart bomb.” In many cases, you don’t know where it starts; you definitely don’t know where it’s going to end. The concepts of these two types of attacks are completely different. In general, I would say that limited nonconventional attacks are mainly chemical attacks and sometimes radiological attacks—these are being called “dirty bomb” attacks. Unlimited attacks are mainly biological, with some exceptions, such as anthrax letters. I would also refer to nuclear attacks as unlimited attacks because of the magnitude of these types of attacks. Modern terrorism strategy is meant to spread fear and anxiety within the overall population. That’s what modern terrorists are trying to achieve—not to kill as many people as possible but to spread fear and anxiety in the maximum number of people.

Limited nonconventional attacks are the most developed stage of modern terrorism because they are meant mainly to create fear and anxiety. An anthrax letter is not necessarily more dangerous than an explosive letter, but people are much more afraid of anthrax letters than explosive letters—although anthrax letters kill much fewer people than explosive letters. So, nonconventional limited attacks are the ultimate stage of modern terrorism—within the same rules of the game of modern terrorism—but unlimited nonconventional attacks are part of a new ballgame. The organizations that are launching these types of attacks are not necessarily interested in creating fear and anxiety but mainly in killing as many people as possible. If they have a problem with the Americans, they can nuke the Americans; if they have a problem with the Jews, they can have a biological attack in Israel. I do believe that this division, this classification between limited and unlimited attacks, helps us understand the probability of those types of attacks. Not every terrorist organization will necessarily launch an unlimited nonconventional attack even if they have the capability to do so, while most of the terrorist organizations that are active today in the international arena would not hesitate to use limited nonconventional attacks, which are still in the rules of the game for modern terrorism.

You have made a distinction between “rational fear” and “irrational fear,” wherein irrational fear is characterized as a fear that bears no relation to the actual statistical probability of being killed or injured in a terror attack. How can policymakers and everyday citizens draw the line between realistic safety precautions and unfounded anxiety?

First of all, what I have emphasized is that each and every one of us has a personal “red line.” Beneath this “red line,” we have rational fear that is proportional to the level of the threat; on top of this red line, we are behaving in an unproportional level to the threat—this is anxiety. It’s very difficult to decide where this red line is crossed. It depends on our personal characteristics, our personal experiences in life, our culture, and our exposure to different forms of terrorism. So there are many factors actually being taken under consideration, but I believe that once you teach the people the difference between rational fear and irrational anxiety, it will be easier for them to define whether they have crossed the red line or not. They must judge, in the most objective way they can, what the real level of the threat is and how they can deal with it. Let me give you an example from a lecture I gave to a Jewish community in New York during the wave of violence between 2000 and 2005. At the end of the lecture, an old couple came up to me with tears in their eyes and said, “We have family and friends in Israel, we love Israel, and we would love to visit Israel. We’ve become very old, and this may be our last chance to visit. But everyone says, ‘Oh, it’s so dangerous to come to Israel.’ You are a counterterrorism expert –what do you say? Is it dangerous or not to visit Israel at this time?” And I was looking very sadly into their eyes when I said, “Anyone who tells you that Israel is a very dangerous place is definitely right; Israel is a very dangerous place—you know why? Because the Israelis are bad drivers!”

In fact, if you count the numbers of victims of terrorism and injuries from terrorism in Israel, there are approximately several dozen casualties per year from terrorist attacks. The peak year was 2002, when we had 300 people who died from terrorist attacks. Now, I’m not underestimating this sum; in a small population like Israel, this is really a big sum of casualties. In that year, we also had approximately 2000 injuries, which is an enormous sum. But every year—not in the peak year—we have 600 people who die in car accidents in Israel and approximately 20,000 who are injured in car accidents. I can assure you that there is not one person on Earth who is afraid to come to Israel because he is afraid to be injured or killed in a car accident. Many are afraid to come to visit Israel because they will be hurt in a terrorist attack. This is an irrational behavior. This is an irrational calculation. That’s the way that one should judge the probabilities of threats of terrorism.

How do terrorist organizations conduct psychological warfare? To what extent do such organizations influence the public through direct communication?

Well, it depends from organization to organization, but in general,I would say that almost all terrorist organizations are using psychological warfare in order to multiply the effects of their attacks. The attack itself has almost no meaning; only the translation of the attack does. Accompanying the attack with a psychological
campaign actually amplifies the attack itself and creates fear in society, which is a necessary factor for terrorists to achieve their political and ultimate goals. Let me give you a quick example: in Israel, in 2001, we had a suicide attack on a discotheque in Tel Aviv called the Dolphinarium discotheque. Many youngsters were injured; more than a dozen were killed, and all of them were sons and daughters of Russian immigrants to Israel. These students, almost all of whom came from the same high school, frequently came to this specific discotheque. My staff and I came to speak to the students after the event, and we found that they were terrified. Now, it’s only natural to be afraid after such an incident, but we found that they were terrified because Hamas, which conducted the attacks, officially announced the attack was planned against this specific discotheque. Hamas claimed to know in advance that the discotheque was being used by Russian immigrants, and it declared that that from then on it would focus its attacks on Russian immigrants to Israel.

These claims only occurred after Hamas learned that the attack actually caused a huge number of casualties and deaths within the Russian immigrant population. Of course, this was a psychological campaign because Hamas didn’t know that this would be the case. It had just learned from Israeli media that this was the outcome of the attack and decided to use that to stop immigration from Russia to Israel. Actually, in almost every video and videocassette that terrorist organizations are producing and manufacturing, there are many messages that they are sending directly and indirectly, which together create this international campaign. As for the websites, blogs, forums, and so forth, Professor Gabriel Weimann, who wrote an interesting book on terrorism and the Internet, refers to something which I find very interesting. He writes that many terrorist organizations, instead of following the new, modern trend of communication via mass media, which is broadcasting, are conducting narrow-casting. This means that they send concrete messages to concrete groups within society. They have concrete messages to kids in the websites, they have concrete messages to women, concrete messages to immigrants, and so on and so forth. So this is a very sophisticated, complex, efficient psychological war that they conduct.

You have said that the media should “avoid broadcasting tapes made by terror organizations and interviews with individual terrorists.” How do you reconcile this restraint with media’s duty to inform the public?

Well, I believe that we should not mix the duty of the media to inform the public and the duty of the media to not play into the hands and manipulation of the terrorists. In modern terrorism, the mass media is a crucial factor, and the whole plan of the terrorist attacks is designed to attract attention and to manipulate the media into transmitting the messages of the terrorists. Now, I’m not saying that the media should not cover terrorist attacks or give information that has been transmitted by terrorists, but I do believe that the media should not play into the hands of the terrorists. It might be easier to understand that if I just change the actors for a minute. Let’s say that the media knows that there is a politician—a minister, for example, or a member of Parliament—who sends a videocassette to the media meant to brainwash the hearts and minds of the people. Would the media consider transmitting this? They wouldn’t. They wouldn’t want to play into the hands of this political manipulation. This is exactly what I would expect them to do in reference to terrorism. I would expect them to judge and to decide what can be transmitted and what cannot be transmitted. My recommendation would be; don’t transmit anything that the terrorists produced themselves. If they have a message to the public, if you think it’s an important message and that it’s your responsibility to give this information to the public, then give it. But give a paraphrased message; don’t give the terrorists a platform.

You advocate undercutting support for terrorist organizations by creating an international fund similar to the Marshall Plan, which will educate and provide social services to Muslims. What has prevented governments from cooperating to implement such a strategy?

Well, I think there are many, many reasons for this. The first reason is that the level of the threat of international terrorism, of global jihadist terrorism, until the last few years, was not considered as great of a danger as thought it was. Therefore, many states—the Western states, and even many Arab and Muslim states—turn a blind eye. They think that this is something that doesn’t necessarily concern them; it’s a problem, but it’s not their problem. I met some people in Switzerland who referred to this problem as a problem of other people, not a Swiss problem, because they are neutral. Of course, there is no link of neutrality here when the opponent doesn’t respect neutrality and when the opponent divides wars into two sections: either you’re with us or against us, either you’re an infidel or a believer. Some Australians who I met before the Bali bombings said, “Yes, I know it’s a problem, but you know, it’s not our problem, it’s not our concern. We’re so different from all of them.” “Different” had a meaning when war was won or lost by deploying armies, by deploying battalions with armored cars and so on and so forth. But when the war is being conducted by suicide attackers, there is no meaningful “difference.” I think that there is no Australian today who believes that he or she is secure from this phenomenon.

So the first problem was the lack of acknowledgement by states that they are really a part of the problem—that they are suffering from the problem or might suffer from it in the future. The second problem is in Arab and Muslim states, which are the key factor in culturing this process of radicalization in the Muslim world; some of them were, and some of them still are, corrupt. You can create this Marshall Plan and give the funds that are needed to confront the Islamic radicalization process within those societies, but in some cases it might end up in the corrupted control of those regimes. This is a concrete problem that needs to be solved. I would say mainly that states needed a wake-up call. Of course, the wake-up call was 9/11 and what came after 9/11, but I personally feel as if I am serving as the wake-up call on a one-to-one basis with military commanders, decision-makers, and members of Parliament, and so on and so forth. It’s a process, and I believe at the end of the day, this is the only way to counter this dangerous trend of Islamic radicalization. I’m optimistic because I believe at the end of the day, states will adopt this or another solution and will enhance international cooperation.

Is fighting the threat of global terror compatible with the defense of liberal, democratic values—especially with regards to the protection of human rights?

I wrote extensively on this in my Ph.D. dissertation. The title of the dissertation is Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy: Efficiency versus Liberal Democratic Values. Now, like it or not, there is a contradiction between the two sides. One should acknowledge the fact that efficient counterterrorism hurts some liberal democratic values. You can be most effective in counterterrorism if you are a dictatorship. You can be the most liberal and democratic and guard all of the liberal democratic values if you don’t suffer from terrorism and you don’t want to take part in the international campaign against terrorism. But most states today are not at those two ends, and therefore they acknowledge that they need to sacrifice some liberal democratic values in order to gain some efficiency in counterterrorism. The whole question is a question of balance. The whole question is a question of finding the golden bridge in which you still guard the essence of liberal democratic values and you don’t play into the hands of the terrorists and eventually surrender to the terrorists. A few years ago, I met a good friend of mine, Professor Irwin Cotler, who was until recently, the Minister of Justice in Canada. I met him 20 years ago, when he was a professor of human rights law at McGill University in Canada. When I met him then, he was telling me, “You know, I am a counterterrorist, and I am a human rights activist. And the reason is that I support the most important right of every person on Earth—the right to live.” And that is how I refer to myself as well as anyone who is engaged in counterterrorism. Those people are actually human rights activists, because they are trying to support and protect the most important right of any human being, the right to live. Now, to do that, you cannot destroy rights of others; you cannot threaten rights of others. Again, the question is a question of balance. To be complete, if I were to be persuaded that in order to defend the lives of many people, in a very concrete way, I need to create some inconvenience to some other people, I would not hesitate to do so. If I would know that in order to save the lives of the general people, I would need to risk the lives of others or hurt their rights by torturing them and so forth, I would definitely hesitate and probably would refrain from doing that. But the question is a question of balance. Many human rights activists worldwide are trying to present it as if it is a black and white issue, but it’s not. It is a complicated question. The only way for all of us to find solutions to these complicated questions is to work together.

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