Conducted by Michael Camarda

Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation specializes in the United States’ economic, security, and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal. She was previously a lead expect on South Asia for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, senior advisor in the State Department’s South Asia bureau, and political analyst on South Asia for the Central Intelligence Agency.

In your recent article “Pakistan Can Achieve Stability Through Democracy,” you write: “The more President Musharraf seeks to mollify Islamic radicals and sideline the secular parties, the more influence religious radicals gain. In a free election, however, the mainstream secular parties would almost certainly fare much better than the religious parties, thereby bringing a mandate against religious extremism and helping to guarantee Pakistan stays a course of stability and moderation.” With Musharraf’s fragile hold on power, how likely is this to happen? If it were to happen, how easily would religious parties be brought into the fold of a true democratic government?

The mainstream secular Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led in exile by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, continues to be the political party with the largest base of grassroots support in the country. In the 2002 elections, the PPP received 25 percent of the vote, while the religious parties captured only 11 percent. The religious parties traditionally have received less than about eight percent of the popular vote and had been marginalized in the 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 national elections.
The handling of the general elections scheduled to take place by mid-February 2008 is critical to the future direction of the country. A free and fair election that includes the full participation of the main secular democratic parties, including the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), would almost certainly demonstrate that the majority of Pakistanis support a moderate, progressive agenda for the country. Although the religious parties may do OK in the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces bordering Afghanistan, they are unlikely to put up a good showing in the more populous Punjab and Sindh provinces. The bottom line is if Musharraf denies the secular parties the chance to fully participate in the political process, they will be further weakened and less able to play a moderating role in society.

Pakistan is a key player in a larger dilemma in America’s War on Terrorism—how to balance our relationships our allies who are sometimes not the most democratic, yet are with us against al Qaeda, against the need for true democratic reform that might result in a fundamentalist victory like in Algeria in 1992. How does America both bolster allies and promote democracy?
 
The current situation in Pakistan is not comparable to the situation in Algeria in 1992, when the large majority of the population supported the religious party. In Pakistan, the secular parties now have the stronger grassroots support. However, if the secular parties are prevented from fully participating in Pakistan’s electoral process, their party structures will suffer and they will lose supporters to the religious parties. People are often confused about the political situation in Pakistan and equate it with that of other Arab Muslim states like Algeria, Egypt, or Lebanon. One must understand that in Pakistan Musharraf has sidelined the mainstream secular parties in order to solidify his own hold on power, which has in turn strengthened the religious parties.

Musharraf’s presidency is set to end on November 16, 2007. What is likely to play out?

Musharraf’s plan is to get himself reelected by the current parliament, which has been in power since 2002. A major question is whether he plans to give up his dual role of president and chief of the army before he seeks reelection. If he does not shed his uniform, he is likely to face challenges from the Supreme Court, which is demonstrating an increasing willingness to act independently as a check on the presidency. Witness the Supreme Court’s recent decision to grant bail to Javed Hashmi, a prominent opposition leader jailed in 2003 on charges of inciting mutiny in the army, forgery, and defamation. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto apparently would support Musharraf’s reelection by the current assemblies this fall in exchange for free and fair general elections early next year in which her party would likely win the most votes and she would again become prime minister. She has warned that if Musharraf seeks reelection in uniform from the current assemblies, however, he is likely to face court challenges on the issue.

Whether or not the general elections are considered transparent, free, and fair will also determine the response of the mainstream parties.

Musharraf has stated that without his support, America’s War on Terrorism might be lost before it began. How vital is Pakistan to the war on terrorism?

Pakistan’s support for the War on Terrorism is vital. But Pakistan also benefits from the military and economic assistance the U.S. provides. A strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in both countries’ national security interests. Pakistan made the right choice after 9/11 to support the U.S.-led fight against global terrorism. The reasons that it made that decision are still valid, given the ongoing terrorism problem in the region and U.S. commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan. It is also in Pakistan’s interest that Afghanistan be stabilized and that terrorism be rooted out of the region.

Questions abound about the ability and the willingness of Pakistan to control the extremist groups that exist within the country. Many point to connections between Pakistani military officials and the Taliban. What is the nature of these links? And what can both Musharraf and the United States do to make sure these links are terminated?

Many in the Pakistani security establishment calculate that the U.S. will not remain committed to Afghanistan and that the country eventually will return to its pre-9/11 status. These officers support the Pakistani military’s maintaining its links and support for the Taliban, which they believe will again play a role in governing the country. Although President Musharraf himself is committed to the fight against terrorism, it is not clear that he has full control of all of the elements of his intelligence and security services. There are deep institutional links between the intelligence and security services and the Taliban. President Musharraf has already faced at least two assassination attempts because of his cooperation with the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts, so this is obviously not an easy situation to rectify. The best approach for the U.S. is to demonstrate its commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan, to convince the Pakistanis that it is not in their interest to allow the Taliban safe haven within their borders, and to improve cooperation with Pakistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda elements along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In its post-9/11 agreement with Pakistan, America promised to respect the territorial integrity of Pakistan. What role do Americans in Afghanistan play in coordinating attacks on Taliban and al Qaeda militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas? If Americans were to cross the border—even mistakenly—in pursuit of high-level al Qaeda operatives, what would the ramifications be?
 
This is a critical issue. The U.S. and coalition forces are responsible for confronting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, while the international community looks to Pakistan to control terrorist elements on its own territory. When Pakistan made “peace deals” with tribal leaders along the Afghanistan border last September, many observers assessed this would only strengthen terrorist elements in the region. The intelligence now reveals that that is exactly what happened. Not only did the “peace deals” make it easier for the Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup and retrench in the area, they also fueled the Talibanization of the area by allowing extremists to enforce strict Islamic edicts, such as closing down girls’ schools, barber shops, and video stores. These are the same tactics the Taliban employed in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.

There already is a great deal of cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan intelligence services and military forces that does not receive public attention. For instance, al Qaeda number-two Ayman al-Zawahiri was targeted twice in 2006 in missile attacks in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. Musharraf faced a great deal of domestic criticism after these attacks, which resulted in several civilian casualties. It is in Musharraf’s interest for U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation to be played down publicly, since he does not want to appear to be cooperating too closely with the U.S., especially when operations result in Pakistani civilian casualties.

What can the U.S. do to ensure Pakistan’s continued cooperation, even after Musharraf leaves office, as the War on Terror continues into the foreseeable future?

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is a two-way street in which both sides benefit. The U.S. has provided Pakistan with over $10 billion in economic and military assistance over the last five years, which has contributed to stabilizing the country’s economy and improving its military capabilities. Pakistan has captured and turned over to the U.S. senior Al Qaeda leaders, but the U.S. is now looking for more cooperation against the Taliban in order to help stabilize Afghanistan. Pakistan also looks to the U.S. to help provide a stabilizing influence vis-a-vis Indo-Pakistani relations. The U.S. played a critical role in helping to defuse Indo-Pakistani military crises in 1999 and again in 2001 and 2002. Although I understand the frustration of the U.S. Congress with Pakistan over its lack of commitment to cracking down on the Taliban, I don’t think the passage of legislation conditioning military assistance to Pakistan will help garner more cooperation on this front. This legislation only brings up memories of the U.S.’ Pressler Amendment, which was implemented in 1990, abruptly cutting off all U.S. assistance to Pakistan because of its nuclear program. The Pakistanis viewed this action as a betrayal by the U.S., especially considering how closely the two countries cooperated to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan in the 1980s. The new legislation, which became law on August 3, will likely fuel concerns that the U.S. is an unreliable long-term partner and reinforce the view that Pakistan needs to keep its foreign policy options open—which means maintaining ties to the Taliban.

You wrote, “The Pakistan military’s pervasive involvement in civilian affairs has stifled the development of civil society and the establishment of democratic institutions. Pakistan has been ruled by the military for over half of its existence. Even during periods of civilian rule, the military has wielded tremendous power over decision-making. Although the military is unlikely to submit fully to a civilian government in the near term, Washington should set benchmarks that begin to restrict the military’s role in Pakistani politics.” How can the U.S. set benchmarks for this process to which the sovereign nation of Pakistan will adhere?

The U.S. should convey to Musharraf the importance of returning the country to democratic civilian rule. Although there was support in Pakistan for Musharraf’s taking power in 1999, the Pakistani public is growing wary of military rule, as evidenced by the public uproar over his attempt to dismiss the country’s chief justice in March. Unless Musharraf builds bridges between the military and civilian leadership and begins to work toward a power-sharing arrangement, we are likely to see his own credibility undermined and more and more Pakistanis willing to take to the streets to demand a return to democratic rule. Any discussion of benchmarks would likely take place at the diplomatic level. The U.S. should take a consistent public position in support of free, fair, and transparent elections and discourage any pre-election manipulation of the process.

What are the long-term strategic implications for Pakistan in the War on Terrorism? What is the future of American-Pakistani relations? Where is Pakistan in five or ten years?

It is difficult to say where Pakistan will be in five or ten years, let alone in one or two. Pakistan’s economy is in better shape than it was seven years ago. However, the country faces greater threats to its stability from religious extremists, primarily because of the war in Afghanistan and the lack of a firm government policy against Taliban elements inside Pakistan. These Taliban operatives have become emboldened in the northwest of the country, and Islamic vigilantes had brazenly taken on the Pakistan military at the Red Mosque to try to force an Islamic revolution. Pakistanis themselves are growing increasingly concerned about the direction of their country. Steps toward civilian, democratic rule that would result in greater influence and power for the secular parties would help counter the increasingly bold and dangerous influence of religious zealots.

What are the implications and ramifications of Barack Obama’s recent comments that if Pervez Musharraf would not act to destroy Al Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan, he would as president? How big a shift is this from the Bush administration’s current stance? And why do you feel he chose to say this?

The Bush administration has said it would pursue Al Qaeda anywhere if it had actionable intelligence, but the presumption was that it would do so in cooperation with the Pakistanis. In fact, there have been two missile strikes on suspected hideouts of al Zawahiri in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, so clearly Washington and Islamabad are working together on this problem. Obama’s pointed reference to unilateral U.S. military action in Pakistan went further in tone and substance than previous Bush administration statements. We need Pakistan as a partner in the War on Terrorism, and there’s a lot we can accomplish together. Obama’s comments were not helpful in promoting a spirit of cooperation between our two countries and may have led the average Pakistani to fear that an attack by the U.S. is imminent.
 

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