A Former Diplomat Addresses the Problems in U.S.-China Relations

By Harvey Feldman

Over the years, there has been a well-defined tendency in Washington, particularly among China specialists in the State Department, though rather less so in the Pentagon, the Congress, and the agencies of government concerned with trade, to avoid any real discussion of problems with China and its policies. The usual statement is, if we treat China as an enemy, it will become one. This assumes a frank discussion of problems will make China just that—an enemy—and so we had better not mention them. But doing so ignores the real possibility that minor irritants untreated become major, and that major irritants untreated can lead to real crises. It also means when dealing with China on, for example, trade problems, we do so in ways quite unlike any other trading partner.

But here, away from the government and the press, let’s see if we can address in frank detail some of the more important issues in U.S.-China relations.

Let me begin with a kind of heresy. The greatest challenge I see to peaceful and constructive U.S.-China relations is not conflict over Taiwan, or disagreement over how to deal with North Korea, or escalating trade tensions. The greatest risk I see is a steady drift toward great power rivalry which over time can become truly adversarial relations. In Beijing, some see the United States as bent upon denying China its rightful place in the world. At the same time, publications of the People’s Liberation Army in Chinese, though not in English, routinely and openly state that the United States is China’s enemy and must be confronted. Meanwhile, in Washington, only a few are prepared to describe Beijing’s policies as designed to undercut American interests around the world.

Let me be specific. While Washington works with other countries and with the United Nations to halt genocide in Sudan, China supports the government in Khartoum with oil deals, arms sales, and the threat of using its veto to protect Sudan from international sanctions. In Iran, whose nuclear programs are a concern to its neighbors, to the EU, and to the U.S., China supports Tehran with oil purchases and, again, arms sales. In Uzbekistan, within a week of international—including EU and U.S.—condemnation of a bloody crackdown on peaceful protesters, China honored President Karimov with a state visit, arms sales, and economic deals. China ostentatiously supports the evil Mugabe in Zimbabwe, undisturbed by his use of thugs to beat and send to emergency rooms his political opponents.

There are other trends. China works hard to keep the U.S. out of multilateral organizations in Southeast Asia. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which links the Central Asian states with Russia and China, Beijing has vetoed observer status for America though granting it to Iran. We should note that under the SCO banner, China and Russia in August 2005 carried out major military maneuvers involving an amphibious landing and the use of strategic bombers.

Speaking of military matters, over the last several years Beijing has engaged in a steady build-up of offensive arms, including most recently an 18-percent hike in the published portion of its military budget. China already has more than enough arms to overwhelm Taiwan and has good relations with all of its neighbors, including, for the first time in history, Russia. One may well wonder against whom it is that China arms. By the way, the real military budget, expressed in purchasing power parity terms, is probably more than three times the published $45 billion figure, and so is more than any NATO member spends, other than the U.S.

In reality, there is little mystery in why China buys Russian surface combatants which were designed specifically to attack American aircraft carriers, as well as the very latest in Russian submarines and aircraft. And then there is the well-documented and extremely extensive network of Chinese spies attempting—often successfully—to tap into the most sensitive areas of the American defense establishment.

Note that I have said nothing so far about Taiwan, or human rights violations, or trade, or currency issues. As for the latter two, the major irritant is China’s habit of turning a blind eye to piracy of intellectual property, even when it is done by State-Owned Enterprises or companies allied with the People’s Liberation Army. I hope that, ultimately, as China itself becomes a major creator of intellectual property, it will see its own interest in dealing with these things. But meanwhile, despite promise after promise, little is done. Prodded by Congress, the U.S. has now, for the first time, filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization.

By just about any measure, China’s currency is undervalued. The Economist believes it undervalued by about 20 percent. The International Institute of Economics, a Washington research institute, believes the figure is closer to 40 percent. Now, I do not believe that a major upward revaluation will solve the problem of America’s trade deficit with China—likely to be in the vicinity of an astounding $250 billion this year—but, nevertheless, such a move surely would be seen as meaning China is moving away from its mercantilist view of international trade. More attention to World Trade Organization commitments about leveling the playing field would help as well.

As for Taiwan, despite the more than 900 short-range missiles that are emplaced opposite the island republic, I have to say I am quite optimistic that there will be no war. If China’s leaders were truly Marxist, and therefore believed that economic relationships are determinative, they ought to sit back confident in the knowledge that Taiwan’s investment on the mainland now totals roughly $220 billion; that there are about one million Taiwanese who live and do business in China; that increasing numbers of young Taiwanese come to study in Chinese universities. So no need to go to war, particularly since an unprovoked attack on Taiwan would almost surely involve the United States with consequences truly awful to all concerned.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Strait, a majority of Taiwanese, if they could do so, would want to live in a state that was formally independent, and accepted as such by the international community. But in fact they understand that Beijing would feel obligated to intervene militarily were they to declare that formal independence. And so they settle for the status quo as the best obtainable under present circumstances.
For the American government too, preservation of the status quo is the present sine qua non. The Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, states the U.S. determination that the Taiwan question be settled—if it is to be settled at all—without resort to arms. The current and past Administrations have said that any change in Taiwan’s status must come about peacefully and with the consent of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. You can think of this as a policy of “double deterrence” calling each side to maintain the status quo.

At this point, I should try to demystify the U.S. “One China policy.” Beijing has something it calls the “One China Principle,” and it goes like this: there is but one China in the world, its capital is in Beijing, and Taiwan is a province of that China. The American “One China policy” is quite different and it goes like this: we will have diplomatic relations only with China, but we will have every other kind of relationship—economic, financial, immigration, and for the sale of defensive weapons—with Taiwan. Back when I was involved in formulating U.S. policy on this issue, I coined the following mantra: the U.S. will not propose a solution, for that is up to the parties. The U.S. will not oppose any solution that is acceptable to the two sides freely and without coercion of any kind.

Finally, I want to commend to you the excellent summary of U.S.-China relations, and where they should be going, given in a speech given by Robert Zoellick when he was deputy secretary of state on September 21, 2005 to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. For those who may not know much about him, Mr. Zoellick has for years been one of America’s foremost thinkers about international relations, and before becoming deputy secretary of state, the number two job in that department, was for four years the United States trade representative. He is now president of the World Bank.

He began by stating, “It is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership in the international system. We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.” As a “stakeholder,” said Mr. Zoellick, China would be more than a member of the international system. It would work to sustain the international system that has contributed so much to its success, rather than just riding free of charge. “Cooperation as stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences—we will have disputes that we need to manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits.” He went on to point out, as one example among many, that great states, members of the world trade community, ought not allow the blatant piracy of others’ intellectual property and that realistic steps to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems should be seen as the common goal.

I could not think of a better explanation of what we want from China, and what it should want for itself.

Harvey Feldman, Distinguished Fellow in China Policy at The Heritage Foundation, helped plan President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. As director of the Office of the Republic of China Affairs, he established the successor to the U.S. embassy in Taipei and later helped draft the Taiwan Relations Act. He served as U.S. ambassador to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and as delegate to six UN General Assemblies and represented the U.S. on numerous international commissions. His books include Taiwan in a Time of Transition and Constitutional Reform and the Future of China.

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