Conducted by Michael Camarda

The EU’s arms embargo against China went into affect in the summer of 1989 as a result of the Tiananmen Square repression by the Chinese government. Why is it still in effect in 2007?

It remains in effect because the now-twenty-seven member states of the EU have not unanimously agreed to lift the sanctions, and such action would require unanimous agreement. On one level, the expansion of the EU by bringing in twelve new members from post-communist Central Europe has added a new level of complexity and opposition to lifting the embargo, as many of these countries are not so friendly towards Beijing. The other reasons it is still in place include American pressure on the EU; the change of the German chancellorship from Gerhard Schröeder to Angela Merkel, as she opposes the lifting; China’s failure to meet the EU’s human rights demands; and finally China’s passage of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which threatens the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan.

How effective has the embargo been? It is not a legally binding agreement and is constructed of fairly vague language. EU member states have the ultimate authority on which arms are sold to China, and some EU countries have sold weapons to China during the embargo.

That’s correct. The so-called “embargo” is actually nothing more than a clause in the June 1989 Madrid Communiqué. It is not legally binding, and it is incumbent on all EU member states to interpret it as they see fit. However, the EU has a “Code of Conduct” which governs their arms sales worldwide, and China is subject to this. They also have legally-binding controls over export of dual-use and defense technologies. These institutions are the enforceable instruments. Moreover, the European Council has been in the process of redrafting and strengthening the Code for more than two years now. My understanding is that their work is complete but has not been adopted yet. At the end of the day, whether or not the “embargo” is lifted, it is this Code of Conduct and the technology export regulars that will govern potential European defense assistance to China.

The leading countries in Europe for lifting the embargo have been France and Shröeder’s Germany, though Merkel wants it in place. Why have these countries led the push for the lifting of the embargo in favor of a Code of Conduct?

My impression is that at the moment only France and Italy, perhaps the Spanish, are in favor of lifting the embargo. All other EU members are agnostic about or are opposed to differing degrees.

Many analysts see the lifting of the embargo as just a matter of time. Will the EU embargo be lifted, and if so, when?

I don’t think it will be lifted anytime soon, although at their December 2006 meeting, the European Council reaffirmed its willingness to carry forward work towards lifting the arms embargo. This was just temporizing language to placate the Chinese government. Much has changed in Europe, with respect to attitudes towards China, over the past year or two since the original push to list the embargo. There is a greater sobriety in Europe now.

EU Commissioner of External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner has stated that China must meet three conditions before the embargo could be raised. These were China’s ratification of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, and the abrogation of the system of no-trial prosecution and re-education through labor. Could the embargo be lifted without these stipulations being put into action?  If not, can and will China do this?
 
These three conditions will effectively ensure that it will not be lifted as the Chinese Government is highly unlikely to meet conditions the second and third conditions, and they have stalled for several years on the first.

The EU often complains that other Western powers are not restricted in arms sales with China. Canada never had an embargo; Russia and Israel sell many armaments to China without rebuke. Australia lifted its embargo in 1992. Does the EU have an argument?  How much of a difference does the EU embargo even mean for China? What other arguments does the EU have in favor of lifting the embargo?

It is true what you say about Canada and Australia, but both have refrained from selling arms or key defense technologies to China since 1989. Of course, Russia and Israel do, as you note. But even in the Israeli case, the U.S. government has monitored these transactions closely and put a stop to some potential sales. The EU itself has sold defense technologies but no lethal arms or ammunition to China in recent years. The most recent public EU figures I have seen put this in the 400-million-Euro range for 2005. So it is clear that the embargo is not a binding one, and this is where the individual EU member state interpretations come in. Nonetheless, there has been broad consultation across the EU, as well as a prohibition against military sales. The EU also sometimes uses the fallacious argument that the United States sells arms to China despite its 1989 sanctions. This is ludicrous and inaccurate. The U.S. sanctions are binding by law, and both the Clinton and Bush administrations have prosecuted several companies that have violated the law.

Why is the United States so opposed to lifting the embargo? Taiwan is certainly one issue. How likely is it for there to be a hot war in the Straits of Taiwan in the near future?  How much of a hindrance to lifting the embargo was the China’s Anti-Secession Bill, passed in March 2005?

The United States is opposed to lifting the embargo because it does not perceive it to be in American interests for the Chinese military to modernize any more quickly than it already is, because that modernization will alter the strategic balance in East Asia. The question is not whether the People’s Liberation Army is modernizing, but how far, how fast, and in what ways? The U.S. does not wish to accelerate this process with European or Israeli arms going to augment PLA capabilities. The U.S. does not wish to face European weapons in Chinese hands. Can you imagine the uproar in this country if a French or Italian anti-ship missile from a Chinese destroyer hit a U.S. Navy vessel?

As you say, Taiwan’s security is another reason, and indeed a real and serious reason. This said, I don’t think there is much of a chance of conflict over Taiwan. Quite to the contrary, all the signs at present are toward increased integration between the two sides.

What kinds of weapons does China want, particularly from the EU, and what is purpose of these weapons?

They would likely seek avionics, fighters, electronic warfare systems, naval guns and torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles.

China’s foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, complains that the EU embargo is a form of “political discrimination” and is an antiquated leftover of Cold War politics. Is he right?

No, I don’t agree with Foreign Minister Li on this point. The embargo is in place for very specific reasons those Ferrero-Waldner outlined, as you mentioned and the Chinese side has known for a long time what is required to meet the conditions. In addition to her three conditions, also repelling the Anti-Secession law, improving military transparency, and removing missiles from opposite Taiwan would further improve China’s chances of having the embargo lifted. But don’t hold your breath that China will see it in their interests to do so.

Could you explain the huge discrepancies among China’s official military budget ($29.9 billion), the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) estimate ($41 billion), the RAND estimate ($51 billion), and the U.S. Department of Defense estimate of China’s military expenditures ($90 billion).

As you note, there is a wide variety estimates of Chinese military spending. I would say three things about them. First, all countries bury and hide military and national security-related spending in other budgets. If the United States added together what it spends on homeland security, veteran affairs, intelligence, and a number of other areas all of which are not included in the U.S. defense budget it would exceed $700 billion, far in excess of the “official” $438 billion defense budget. Second, China’s off-budget military spending and sources of commercial revenue have been steadily brought on-budget in recent years, so that, in my own estimates, China’s total military expenditure is really on the order of 1.8 times the official budget. Third, if China were spending as much as some of these other estimates indicate and I would note that the Pentagon has never explicated its sources or methodologies for its exaggerated claims then I would like to know what the PLA is getting for all this money.

What options does the U.S. have if the embargo is ultimately lifted? How can it keep the most advanced weapons out of PLA hands without an embargo?
 
Even if it were lifted, I would not anticipate European nations approving sales of sophisticated weapons to China they have made that very clear. What the United States should be doing during this interim period, though, is to work with the EU to put in place a series of categories for defense items and technologies that the U.S. could and could not live with, if the embargo is ever lifted.

David Shambaugh is a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and is a professor at The George Washington University.
 

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