Conducted by Michael Camarda

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has pledged a draft for an EU Constitution. How likely is it that this will be achieved during Germany’s leadership of the EU from January to July of this year? The French and the Dutch have rejected the idea, and the UK has remained on the sideline.

What she promised was that she would put out a timetable on how to proceed until 2009 and inject some kind of momentum into the process. She doesn’t want it to stop; she wants it to accelerate. Of course, she’s extremely dependent on France. And before May, when we know about the outcome of French presidential election, nothing much will happen. This leaves her another month, and we should not be too optimistic about what can be done in a month. A lot is about symbolic politics anyway. See, for example, the March 25 summit that celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty in 1957. They staged it as a huge festival in Berlin, with basically two meanings: 1) It was directed toward the German population. Germans do not have to vote on a constitution, so there is no immediate threat. But there is quite a bit of misgiving and apprehension about the EU, even in Germany, which has, since the very beginning, been among the most ardent supporters of European integration. Still, its citizens need to be convinced that the EU really is a wonderful achievement and something to be proud of. Festivals are, as every American knows, a great way to promote such ideas. 2) Another reason to convene this summit in Berlin was to draft some kind of declaration on common values. This is, again, symbolic politics. No decisions are to be taken, but it is made clear that the EU is still united, notwithstanding its political cleavages. This is the major message: We will not split up; we will not separate.

Germany is also the head of the G-8 and as such has called for three things:  financial market transparency, trademark protection, and increased aid to Africa. How likely is it that these goals will be achieved?

The idea about financial transparency is a hot topic. It’s not just a European thing; American CEOs speak out in favor of it as well. So we can expect consensus between the EU and the U.S. on this point which is a crucial condition for politics being successfully enacted. Africa seems to be a similar case. We have recently seen a lot of activity, especially by the U.S. and among private donors or campaigners like Bill Clinton or Bill Gates. Europe seems to be lagging behind and has to catch up. The success of aid to Africa will depend entirely on how state agencies and civil society agents will cooperate. Or, to put it another way, how the European model and the American model can join forces. When it comes to trademark protection, America will probably push the issue more than Europeans will. And we know who is the main addressee: China. As the U.S. is on very good economic terms with China, it can do a lot to convince Chinese leaders to comply.

Does Germany’s colonial history have any effect on the Africa situation? How are Germany’s relations with her former colonies?

German colonial history was a very short period. It started in the mid-1880s and was over by 1918 when France and Britain divided the relatively few remaining colonies among themselves. Germany thus was spared bitter struggles over decolonization and, as a consequence, enjoys a pretty good reputation in Africa nowadays. We might even be inclined to think of her, potentially, as an “honest broker” a role that Bismarck played in the 1870s when Europe went mad about the Balkans.

Germany’s armed forces have grown slowly since 1945. In 1994, we saw the first non-NATO defensive maneuvers, and in 1999, participation in the Kosovo Conflict. We now see them with UNIFIL in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. Whither Germany’s military? In examining military budgets, we see Germany purchasing fewer tanks and more global transport planes. Is Germany planning to project its power all over the world?

Just the opposite. Germany is not on very good terms with its own military. In 2005, when we celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Bundeswehr the armed forces of Germany the German president noted a “friendly lack of interest” among German citizens for its armed forces. There is no heroism, and there is no desire to remake Germany into a great military power. After 1945, a few lessons were learned, for better or worse. One of them was that Germany actually, both Germanies said farewell to its history as an aggressive and militarily potent state. It took Chancellor Adenauer quite some time to convince his fellow citizens of the need to build a new army in 1955, ten years after the war ended. And he could only succeed by stressing its purely defensive nature. Germans by a large large majority either distrust the army or regard it with a lack of enthusiasm and positive interest. This is why Schröder’s promise not to participate in the Iraq war won him the elections in 2002. Even the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Lebanon did not meet with widespread public approval. People don’t want to hear about it; they want the army at home, not engaged, but just defensive. This is actually what the Constitution, the Basic Law, prescribes. The government, any government, would have a hard time in changing this attitude, and it puts close limits on any foreseeable attempt to expand Germany’s military power or Germany’s involvement in world politics.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Runsfeld redeployed many American troops stationed in Europe. What is the significance for Germany?

Germany, and Western Europe in general, doesn’t feel threatened. It might feel threatened by terrorism, a danger that became apparent with the Madrid and London bombings. But the presence of American bases does not help prevent suicide attacks. They did help against the communist threat during the Cold War, which was experienced very vividly in West Germany. This is why West Germans have always been very grateful for the American presence in the Federal Republic. Relations with American soldiers have been close and trusting. But it is widely perceived that this presence is no longer needed. Since the Soviet block dissolved, the major military danger has gone away. For most of Western Europe, Russia does not pose a threat anymore.

We have seen Germany taking a larger global role recently, but budgets since reunification seem to contradict this trend. Defense, foreign aid, and development aid today comprise a significantly smaller portion of the budget than they did in 1990.

Here again, you can’t address this issue without arguing historically. And that’s not just because I’m a historian. It’s because history is a binding force. A force that sets limits, both within and without Europe. After the forced and violent “Germanization” of Europe between 1939 and 1945, Germany had to be very careful adjusting its foreign policy to the fears and apprehensions of its neighbors. Talking about a “larger global role” thus implies that such a role can be harmonized with the interests of other nations. Even after half a century of successful cooperation within the framework of the EU, any German government would still encounter grave suspicions and criticism if it openly laid claim to a “larger global role.” For well-known historical reasons, this claim is contaminated and should not be part of German political language. But let’s face the dire facts: Like many other Western European countries, Germany confronts serious economic and social problems. Costs for health and social welfare are soaring while population and economic growth are non-existent. Unemployment figures are still extremely high, even if they are not rising any higher. Thus the whole social fabric is crumbling, if not now, then in the near future. On top of this, the integration of the “Eastern provinces,” so to speak, is not functioning very well. Unification still puts enormous strain on financial resources, not to mention social and moral ones. The money that is spent here cannot be spent for foreign and development aid. Domestic issues always come first.

Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröeder talked about a “German path” pursuant of national interests. Merkel, like Schröeder, wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Often we see the permanent five plus Germany as key actors on an issue. Is a permanent UNSC in Germany’s future?

I don’t see any chance here, and I think that the German government knows it as well. It was on Schröeder and Fischer’s agendas, but they learned the lesson pretty soon. And I don’t believe they’ll pursue it. By the way, Schröeder only mentioned a “German path” once. The whole public went crazy in a negative way. When any German politician speaks of a “German path,” people get nervous, and rightly so. Without integrated politics, Germany is lost in history.

Merkel wants the EU military embargo kept on China, a sanction that has been in place since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Schröeder pushed for its lifting. What does this mean for EU-China relations?

I don’t think the Merkel government will open its doors to China. We should, of course, not overrate the influence of a single politician and her political attitudes. But for Angela Merkel, who grew up in East Germany and had been bereft of freedom and democratic choices up to her thirty-fifth birthday, it would be very difficult to compromise with regimes that resemble the regime under which she was raised. For her this is a very strong point. If she does not encounter huge pressure from the military-industrial complex which she does not her attitude won’t change. It helps that China is not as prominent a partner for Germany and Europe as it is here in the U.S. Thus the embargo will most likely remain in place, at least when it comes to the German government. But who knows about France and its future president?

Germany has been an avid supporter of Israel. What do its dual G-8 and EU leadership roles mean for that region?

The German position is quite peculiar in Europe, and again this is due to historical circumstances. Germany is probably Israel’s most reliable partner after the U.S. Other European countries, like France, take a different stance. In the EU concert, these differences have to be negotiated and mitigated, regardless of who takes the lead (and for half a year, no less!). I do not believe that Germany’s current high visibility will change EU policy on the Israel-Palestine question. What is more important is the continuous support that Berlin provides for Israel both bilaterally and within the EU.

German nationalism has been frowned upon by Germans themselves for decades, undoubtedly the product of World War II and the Holocaust, but during the 2006 World Cup German pride seemed to be on display for the first time since reunification. Has German nationalism returned?

I was surprised by the reappearance and waving of the national flag. It caused a heated discussion in Germany. What does this behavior mean? Some intellectuals were very critical; others considered it “normal.” Let’s put it this way: If the Turkish-Germans in Berlin adorn their cars and shops and apartments with the German flag during the World Cup, why should the other Germans not do it too? Every other national team and its followers brought along their national flags. This helped to encourage Germans to take out or often buy their own. Some of these flags have remained on balconies and cars, but their colors have faded. And so has German pride until the next World Cup. Personally I do not believe in national pride anyway; I do not understand its language and meaning, and neither do many of my generation.

Merkel is the first female chancellor of Germany. Is this of any significance for German history? Does this present any challenges for Merkel herself?

German women got the right to vote in 1918. It has taken nearly nine decades to elect the first female state leader. In one aspect its significance might not be that great anyone, male or female, who can rise to that level of politics can certainly be seen as a politician before anything else. But the symbolic value should not be underestimated. I believe she will be under closer scrutiny because she’s female. The general attitude in Germany is that she is doing well as a leader. She is not the Nancy Pelosi type; we won’t be seeing her with dozens of children at her feet. Her marriage is not public. But she is taken more and more seriously, and the initial gossip about her hairstyle and suits has more or less stopped.

The German Advisory Council on Global Climate Change has stated that it wants to use to spur change the opportunity of Germany’s having the reigns of both the EU and the G-8. Are there any powers you see arising from this dual leadership position?

Let’s be realistic Angela Merkel cannot change the world. For one, Germany only has a short time to fill both positions. Much of its leadership involves symbolic politics, which is important in itself, but most real change requires continuous ground work behind the scenes. What the current dual position certainly does is lend visibility to Germany. In its spotlight, we see present day Germany as a country trying to overcome its internal blockades. It’s not the sick man of Europe anymore. We are seeing a more optimistic attitude, a more American attitude. We see more self-confidence as well. Especially in environmental politics, Germany has a long and quite successful history. The Green Party, founded in 1980, has made a huge impact both in terms of public consciousness and pragmatic politics. Environmental issues play a large role in Germany, and no political group can afford to neglect them. This is a legacy that can prove of crucial importance in the current debate on global climate change. Germany could give real leadership here, and I truly hope it will.

Ute Frevert is a professor of German history at Yale University whose research interests include women and gender relations in modern Germany, social and medical policy in nineteenth-century Germany, and the impact of military conscription on German society. 

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